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STRANGER AND AFRAID: UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS AND FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
Peter Margulies*
INTRODUCTION
Immigration has historically engendered profound ambivalence in the United
States. A familiar truism holds that the United States is a nation of immi-
grants.' Yet, residents of the United States have often viewed immigrants
with distrust. 2 The status of undocumented workers under federal labor and
employment statutes embodies this tension.
The experience of undocumented workers3 underscores the ambivalence
inspired by immigration. Certain segments of American society, particularly
employers, have historically welcomed undocumented labor.4 Other elements
* Associate Clinical Professor, Hofstra University School of Law; B.A., Colgate University,
1978; J.D., Columbia University, 1981. The author thanks Bernie Jacob, Steve Legomsky, Jerry
Lynch, Michael Perlin, Jean Koh Peters, Ellen Saideman, Andy Schepard, Marjorie Silver, and
Ron Silverman for their comments on drafts of this Article.
1. See J. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Harper Torchbooks ed. 1964) (discussing
history of immigration to America). Emma Lazarus' glowing words promoting the construction
of the Statue of Liberty, "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free," are perhaps the best known expression of the United States' role as a haven for
the oppressed. See The Poems of Emma Lazarus (1889), cited in J. HIGIIAM, STRANGERS IN THE
LANrD: PATTERNS OF AmERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 23 (Atheneum ed. 1977). Interestingly, after
the publication of Lazarus' poem, attention to the Statue of Liberty, judging by the sentiments
articulated at the dedication of the monument, focused on the Statue of Liberty's role as a
symbol of the United State's exporting of democratic values, rather than on the nation as a
place of refuge. See J. HIGHAM, at 63. The Statue of Liberty, therefore, reflects the oscillation
in American attitudes toward immigration.
2. See, e.g., T. ALEINiKOnF & D. MARTn4, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 37-61 (1985)
(discussing classical schizophrenia of United States immigration law; United States has accepted
more refugees for permanent settlement than any other country and yet many of its laws have
been blatantly racist); J. HIGsAM, supra note 1, at 23-27 (same); Schuck, The Transformation
of Immigration Law, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 5-34 (1984) (same). The first part of this Article's
title is from A.E. HousmAN, LAST PoEMs 28 (1922): "l, a stranger and afraid/In a world I never
made."
3. This Article uses the terms "undocumented worker" and "undocumented person" rather
than the term "illegal alien" because the latter term is so loaded with negative connotations that
it obscures issues of policy. Cf. Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy
Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEoo L. Rzv. 63, 63 n.1 (1977) (expressing preference for term "illegal
alien" because this term expressly refers to the illegality of such persons' actions). For thorough
discussions of the problems caused by illegal immigration, see T. ALEiNIKoFF & D. MARTIN,
supra note 2, at 744-98; Note, Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1433-65 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Developments in the Law].
4. See D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN
rH U.S. LABOR MARKET 9-14 (1976) (discussing Southwestern United States' employers' interest
in undocumented workers as source of cheap labor).
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have viewed undocumented workers as a source of ruinous competition. 5 This
disparity has hindered clarification of the rights and remedies of undocu-
mented workers under federal employment law.
These rights and remedies require clarification for two reasons. First,
Congress has recently entered the field of employment relationships involving
domestic employers and undocumented workers by enacting the Immigration
Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"). 6 The IRCA prohibits the hiring of
undocumented workers and establishes sanctions for employers who disregard
that prohibition. Any interpretation of federal employment law regarding
undocumented workers must therefore be consistent with the mandates of
the IRCA. Second, employers' treatment of undocumented workers has a
significant impact on employment policy. Undocumented workers are vul-
nerable. 7 Employers can, and do, exploit undocumented workers by paying
them substandard or illegally low wages' and blocking their attempts at
concerted activity to improve conditions in the workplace. 9 These abuses
worsen the lot of all employees. Making the complete panoply of employment
law protections and remedies available to undocumented workers would help
deter employers from engaging in such exploitation.
Although allowing employers to exploit labor inherently conflicts with
policies underlying employment law,10 one view of immigration policy favors
such exploitation. This view stems from the reward theory of opposition to
employment law remedies for undocumented workers. The reward theory of
immigration policy in effect favors the exploitation of undocumented workers
by holding that allowing undocumented workers to seek the same employment
law remedies as lawful residents-such as back pay and reinstatement-
rewards illegal immigration." Permitting exploitation without recourse elim-
inates this reward. If exploitation makes the undocumented worker's lot a
bitter one, that worker is more likely to leave the United States. Moreover,
prospective undocumented workers who are considering whether to enter the
United States illegally are less likely to emigrate. These results are consistent
with immigration policy.
5. See J. HIGHAM, supra note 1, at 70-72.
6. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, b, 1255a (Supp. IV 1986).
7. One who enters the United States without inspection by immigration officers commits a
crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. IV 1986). One who enters without inspection is also subject to
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982). Persons who overstay the time allowed in the United
States by a particular visa, such as a tourist or a student visa, are also subject to deportation.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
8. See D. NORTH & M. HousTouN, supra note 4, at 127-39; Fogel, supra note 3, at 66.
9. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that employer committed
unfair labor practice by reporting undocumented employees to Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") in retaliation for employees' union activities).
10. "Employment law" refers here to the entire panoply of federal legislation regarding the
relationship between employers and employees. For examples of statutes concerning employment,
see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
11. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 903, 913 n.* (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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The analysis articulated above is intuitively appealing if one is alarmed at
the "reward" for illegal immigration which a comprehensive set of remedies
for undocumented workers might imply. However, there is a major flaw in
the logic of this perspective. By focusing on undocumented workers, the
reward theory neglects the role of domestic employer demand in promoting
illegal immigration. Instead, the effect of employment law remedies on em-
ployer demand for undocumented labor should shape the interaction of
immigration policy and employment law.
This Article argues that granting undocumented workers access to compre-
hensive remedies for employment law violations curbs employer demand for
those workers. Employers hire undocumented workers precisely because they
are susceptible to exploitation.' 2 The availability of employment law remedies,
along with strong guarantees that complaints from undocumented workers
will be kept confidential at all levels of dispute resolution, would give
undocumented workers practical recourse against exploitative employers. Un-
der this regime, employers would have much less incentive to hire undocu-
mented employees.
Comprehensive employment law remedies would also promote a secondary
goal of immigration policy: reducing transfers of resources from United States
taxpayers to undocumented workers. When employers exploit undocumented
workers by not paying them for work performed, by summarily discharging
them for unlawful reasons such as their union involvement, or by denying
them health benefits, undocumented workers may seek assistance from the
government in obtaining these basic needs. 3 Assistance may take the form
of emergency health care or other services that are typically available in the
United States without regard to immigration status. Taxpayers fund these
services. This subsidy of the undocumented population diverts resources and
strains service delivery systems which already deal with staggering problems
among needy citizens and lawful residents. In contrast, remedies which en-
courage domestic employers to comply with non-exploitative employment law
norms in such areas as minimum wages, overtime, and pregnancy benefits
will reduce the public's burden.
Besides yielding policy advantages, comprehensive employment law rights
and remedies for undocumented workers promote the institutional values of
courts and agencies. Courts and agencies are not politically accountable to
the same extent as Congress. Because they lack accountability, these non-
political entities function best with clear guidance from the more accountable
legislative branch. Congress, however, has been coy about the interaction
between immigration law and employment rights and remedies. In coping
with such coyness, courts and agencies, due to their relative unaccountability,
are on firmest institutional ground when they harmonize statutes by giving
12. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text (discussing impact of undocumented
workers on government agencies and programs).
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each the maximum force and effect.1 4 Implying exceptions to the broad
language of a statute is appropriate for courts and agencies only when broad
operation of the statute would clearly frustrate policies underlying other
legislation.
These institutional concerns highlight the tension between employment and
immigration law policies. Generally, the text of employment statutes does not
preclude undocumented workers from coverage. Broad coverage protects all
employees from an erosion of workplace standards. This result obviously
serves employment law values. Moreover, broad coverage does not unequiv-
ocally frustrate, and might even promote, immigration policy. Under the
circumstances, deference to the broad language of employment statutes is
most consistent with the institutional role of courts and agencies.
Comprehensive remedies preserve not only institutional legitimacy, but also
institutional resources. If courts or agencies had to treat undocumented
workers differently, such treatment would involve additional factfinding. A
court or agency would first have to determine an employee's immigration
status, even if it is not trained for the task. The court's time inefficiently
spent on this task reduces the time it has available for dealing with other
employment problems. Finally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") might, in any case, have to make an independent status determi-
nation.
This strain on resources compares unfavorably with the streamlined char-
acter of the comprehensive remedial approach. Comprehensive remedies re-
quire much less factfinding, because in most cases an undocumented worker's
immigration status would be irrelevant. Under the comprehensive approach,
a violation by an employer would typically trigger the full range of remedies,
including reinstatement and back pay. Subsequent factfinding would therefore
be unnecessary."
The analysis presented in this Article develops both institutional and policy
perspectives in arguing for the comprehensive approach. Previous commentary
has displayed more modest aspirations. Much of the literature accords some
14. See infra notes 113-39 and accompanying text (discussing problems with Congress'
responses to undocumented workers and need for coordination by the judiciary).
15. There are two exceptions to this reduced need for fact-finding: first, when an undocu-
mented person has already left the United States; and, second, when an employer hired an
undocumented worker after November 6, 1986, the effective date of the IRCA, and that worker
presented false proof of citizenship or lawful residence to his employer. See infra notes 149-74
and accompanying text for a complete discussion of this point. In addition, the court or agency
may engage in some fact-finding in order to dispose of issues such as mitigation of damages,
which may affect the size of a back pay award. In National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
proceedings, the decision-maker usually resolves mitigation issues in the second stage of the
proceeding, which concerns bringing a culpable employer into compliance with the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and not in the first stage, which treats matters of culpability
and policy. See Note, Retaliatory Reporting of Illegal Alien Employees. Remedying the Labor-
Immigration Conflict, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1296, 1306-07 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Retaliatory
Reporting].
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credence to the notion that comprehensive relief will usually reward and
encourage illegal immigration, or violate some tenet of immigration policy
expressed in the employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA.1 6 The existing
commentary, however, does not discuss the question of taxpayer transfers to
undocumented workers, and largely neglects institutional values. Commen-
tators have also focused on the status of undocumented workers under specific
statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),"7 instead of
16. See Comment, Remedies For Undocumented Workers Following a Retaliatory Discharge,
24 SAN DmtEo L. REv. 573, 594 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Remedies For Undocumented
Workers] (reinstatement of workers hired after effective date of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act ("IRCA") would violate employer sanctions provisions); Comment, Illegal Aliens
as "Employees" under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 GEo. L.J. 851, 866-69 (1980)
[hereinafter Comment, Illegal Aliens] (reinstatement of undocumented workers would frustrate
immigration policy); Note, Rights Without A Remedy-Illegal Aliens Under the National Labor
Relations Act: Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Company v. NLRB, 27 B.C.L. REv. 407, 444-
46 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Rights Without A Remedy] (discussing effects of NLRA protections
on INA policy and concluding that INA policy must supercede NLRA protections when a conflict
exists). But see Kutchins & Tweedy, No Two Ways About It: Employer Sanctions Versus Labor
Law Protections for Undocumented Workers, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 339, 360-61 (1983) (enactment
of employer sanctions proposals would "eviscerate" NLRB's power to order remedies for labor
law violations directed against undocumented employees). Cf. Comment, A Human Rights
Approach to the Labor Rights of Undocumented Workers, 74 CALrF. L. REv. 1715, 1741-42
(1986) [hereinafter Comment, Human Rights] (availability of labor law protections does not
encourage illegal immigration); Note, The National Labor Relations Act and Undocumented
Workers: Local 512 v. NLRB After the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 62 WASH.
L. REv. 595, 608-09 (1987) [hereinafter Note, After the IRCA] (while reinstatement of undo-
cumented worker may conflict with the IRCA, failure of court or agency to order reinstatement
would compromise labor law objectives); Note, Immigration Reform: Solving the "Problem" of
the Illegal Alien in the American Workforce, 7 CARwozo L. REv. 223 (1985) (enforcement of
labor law would promote immigration objectives more effectively than would employer sanctions).
17. See authorities cited supra notes 15-16. For more commentary on the NLRA and
immigration policy, see Bracamonte, The National Labor Relations Act and Undocumented
Workers: The De-Alienation of American Labor, 21 SAN DiEoo L. REv. 29 (1983); Comment,
Illegal Aliens' Rights Under the NLRA, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1525. For a discussion of the
application of the NLRA to undocumented persons which focuses on administrative law issues
concerning the ambit of the NLRB's discretion in fashioning remedies for unfair labor practices,
see Mendez, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Court and the Scope of Board Discretion
in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 134 U. PA. L. Ray. 703 (1986).
Commentators have also discussed the relationship between the IRCA and the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"). See Comment, Protection For Undocumented Workers Under the
FLSA: An Evaluation In Light of IRCA, 25 SAN Diaoo L. REv. 379 (1988); Note, Conflict or
Double Deterrence? FLSA Protection of Illegal Aliens and the Immigration Reform and Control
Act, 72 MINN. L. REv. 900 (1988).
Commentary on the NLRA and the FLSA, however, is not very instructive when one is
considering other employment statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), which bars discrimination by employers on the basis of race, gender,
religion, or national origin, because an employer who violates such statutes will not always realize
a straight-forward pecuniary advantage by doing so. When an employer does not derive direct
pecuniary advantage from violating a statute, it is more difficult to explain why giving an
undocumented worker rights and remedies under that statute will decrease employer demand for
undocumented labor and thereby promote immigration policy. See infra notes 85-89 and accom-
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examining the full spectrum of employment legislation. This Article cultivates
a broader view.
The Article consists of five sections. Section I introduces the problem of
undocumented workers' status under federal employment law. This section
discusses judicial and administrative interpretations of undocumented work-
ers' employment rights to date and the impact of the IRCA on the analysis.
Section II considers the effectiveness of various remedies, such as cease
and desist orders, back pay, and reinstatement, with respect to labor and
employment law. This section concludes that a full range of remedies con-
tributes to stronger employment law enforcement than imposing a single
remedy. A system which provides undocumented labor with comprehensive
relief enhances two elements vital to enforcement: 1) the magnitude of
sanctions against employers, and, 2) the extent of victim cooperation.
Section III demonstrates that these factors also favor imposing compre-
hensive employment law remedies as a supplement to immigration policy.
This section includes a discussion of how broad remedies will ease taxpayer
transfers to the undocumented population and promote institutional values.
Section IV outlines key features of the comprehensive remedial approach,
including confidentiality, and the range of remedies available. This section
also discusses two situations which require modifications of the comprehensive
approach. In the first situation, the undocumented worker is absent from the
United States; in the second situation, the employer has complied with the
IRCA.
Section V discusses three objections to the comprehensive approach: first,
that judicial reinstatement of undocumented workers invariably conflicts with
the IRCA by reducing the employment opportunities of lawful residents;
second, that the approach offends equity by rewarding the crime of illegal
immigration; and, third, that the comprehensive approach damages the lawful
resident's sense of sovereignty by obliging her to share the benefits of
American law with uninvited guests.
I. INTRODUCING Tm PROBLEM
Congress has recently been very active in creating a framework for the
regulation of employment relationships involving undocumented workers. For
years, the word "employment" was exempt from the provision of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act ("INA") which made it a crime to "willfully
or knowingly concea[l], harbo[r], or shiel[d] from detection" any undocu-
mented worker. 8 In 1986, however, Congress enacted the IRCA.' 9 The IRCA
panying text. Nonetheless, this Article's approach is also useful in construing statutes other than
the NLRA or FLSA because it articulates a framework through which a court or agency may
consider such employment statutes in spite of these inherent differences.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (1982).
19. See id. §§ 1324a, b, 1255a (Supp. IV 1986). For an account of the passage of the IRCA
by one of its sponsors, see Mazzoli, Immigration Reform: The Path to Passage and Beyond, 14
J. OF LEOIS. 41 (1987).
[Vol. 38:553
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replicates the historical conflict between American instincts of distrust and
invitation of immigrants. It has three main components:
1) it imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly, or without seeking
appropriate documentation, hire or recruit an employee who is not authorized
to work in the United States;20
2) it prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or appli-
cants for employment who are not "unauthorized alien[s]" based on that
individual's national origin or citizenship status (the latter term refers to
lawful permanent resident workers who timely apply for citizenship); 21 and,
3) it grants amnesty to those individuals who can establish that they entered
the United States before January 1, 1982, and have resided in the United
States unlawfully since that time. 22
The IRCA represents a classic case of legislative compromise.23 Its provi-
sions-employer sanctions, amnesty, and nondiscrimination--cater to two
opposing forces: inclusionists, who favor greater receptivity to immigrants;
and exclusionists, who distrust any increase in population from abroad. 24 The
exclusionist impulse provided the initial impetus for the latest bout of im-
migration reform. 25 Those who support exclusionism seem concerned with
one overriding goal: to "preserve jobs in America for United States citizens.2 6
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. IV 1986).
21. Id. § 1324b.
22. Id. § 1255a.
23. The Supreme Court has often recognized that legislation develops from a legislature's
accommodation of competing interests. The Court has on occasion declined to consider arguments
beyond the text of a statute because such a venture may result in one party getting more than
it bargained for. See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-26 (1980) (declining to
adopt longer limitations period for filing charge of employment discrimination with administrative
agency); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623-26 (declining to authorize damages
for "loss of society" under the Death on the High Seas Act where statute authorizes recovery
only for "pecuniary loss"), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978). For an evocative account of
compromise in the enactment of a specific statute, see E. REDMAN, TIH DANCE OF LEGISLATION
(1973) (describing passage of National Health Service Act). For more theoretical accounts of the
legislative process, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv.
873 (1987); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 269-80 (1982).
24. Cf. Schuck, supra note 2, at 8-53 (discussing opposing sentiments about immigration
with reference to a larger dialogue between individualist and communal impulses in American
legal culture).
25. See T. ALEnIcKoFF & D. MARTIn, supra note 2, at 787-94; Mazzoli, supra note 19, at
41-42 (describing history of enactment); Comment, Illegal Immigration: Employer Sanctions and
Related Proposals, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 149, 160-66 (1981) (discussing antecedent of IRCA).
One should, however, avoid oversimplifying the design of the IRCA's supporters. Many advocates
of employer sanctions distinguish legal immigration, which they endorse, from illegal immigration.
Indeed, one rationale for employer sanctions was that, without effective control of illegal
immigration, support for legal immigration would erode. See Mazzoli, supra note 19, at 41. Cf.
Schuck, supra note 2, at 85-90 (arguing that judicial solicitude for undocumented persons may
precipitate divisions in American society).
26. 132 CoNG. REc. H2408 (daily ed. May 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
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The rationale behind the exclusionist theory in immigration reform is that
undocumented workers take jobs in America away from "Americans." The
employer sanctions provisions are a direct product of this sentiment. Because
an employer who hires undocumented workers is subject to sanction, that
employer has an increased incentive to employ lawful residents of the United
States. An employer sanctions statute would have satisfied exclusionists.
However, inclusionists were troubled by the harshness of unadorned sanctions
and received some concessions in return for supporting the legislation. 27
This dynamic of compromise even permeates the very employer sanctions
provisions in the IRCA which seem to favor the exclusionists. Although the
employer sanctions provisions seem at first blush like a categorical bar on
the employment of undocumented workers, the statute mitigates the harshness
of such a broad rule in that it:
1) exempts those employees hired, recruited or referred prior to the effective
date of the Act, November 6, 1986;28
2) exempts continued employment of persons hired before November 6,
1986;29 and,
3) permits the Attorney General to authorize employment of an undocu-
mented person who presents a prima facie case for amnesty.30
Although the broader implications of these exemptions for the ambit of
federal law governing labor and employment are not clear, the effect of the
exemptions on the employer sanction provisions is straightforward. A hypo-
thetical fact situation may help delineate the areas of clarity and uncertainty.
Suppose an employer has hired an undocumented worker to work as, for
instance, a garment presser. The employer hired the presser on June 6, 1986,
and he still works for the company. He has worked for the company
continuously since his hiring. Is the employer subject to sanctions under the
IRCA? The answer is, "No." Because the employee was hired before No-
vember 6, 1986, the effective date of the IRCA, his hiring and continued
employment after November 6, 1986, is legal under the IRCA.
Let us alter the hypothetical scenario somewhat. Suppose an employer hires
an undocumented worker in February, 1987. The worker, however, had
submitted a prima facie application for amnesty to the Attorney General,
who provided the worker with papers authorizing his employment. Such
employment also explicitly complies with the terms of the employer sanctions
provisions.
A different wrinkle may provide a more challenging problem. An employer
hired an undocumented person to work as a dress presser on February 1,
1987. This worker entered the country illegally, resided here illegally, and did
27. See Mazzoli, supra note 19, at 42 (discussing need for coupling employer sanctions with
legalization of undocumented workers living in the United States for period of time).
28. IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)(3)(A) (codified as a note at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp.
IV 1986)).
29. Id. § 101(aX3)(B) (codified as a note at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. IV 1986)).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
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not apply for amnesty because he did not meet the relevant criteria. Is the
employer subject to sanctions under the IRCA? The answer is, "Yes."
Because the employer hired the dress presser after the effective date of the
statute, and the presser is not authorized to work by the Attorney General,
the IRCA makes this employment relationship illegal.
Analyzing the above fact situations yields three different categories of
undocumented workers:
1) Grandfathered workers. This group consists of those hired before No-
vember 6, 1986, the effective date of the IRCA. The employer sanctions
provisions do not apply to grandfathered workers.
2) Amnesty candidates. This group consists of workers who have made a
prima facie case for amnesty and have received authorization to work from
the Attorney General. Here, too, the employer sanctions provisions do not
apply.
3) Non-grandfathered workers. Undocumented workers who do not fall
within either of the above two groups-those hired on or after November 6,
1986, and who are not amnesty candidates-make up this group. The em-
ployer sanctions provisions apply to this group of workers.
This analysis, however, becomes more complicated when one considers the
IRCA in connection with other federal employment and labor legislation. For
example, the NLRA 1 bars retaliation and discrimination against, and inter-
ference with, employees seeking to form or join a labor union; the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") 2 provides a minimum wage requirement and a
maximum hours limitation for employees; and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII")3 3 bars discrimination in employment based on race,
sex, religion, or national origin.3 4 These statutes embody strong national
policies favoring humane working conditions and opposing employer over-
reaching and the reliance on invidious criteria in making employment deci-
sions. Do these protections extend to the undocumented workers that the
employer hired before November 6, 1986 (the grandfathered employee)? Do
these laws protect the prima facie amnesty applicant? Finally, does federal
employment legislation protect the non-grandfathered worker, who is not
grandfathered in under the IRCA and also has not submitted a prima facie
amnesty application? Before seeking to answer these questions, it is helpful
to briefly examine how the Congress, courts, and agencies have handled the
issues involved thus far.
31. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3) (1982).
32. Id. § 201-19.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
34. Other legislation pertaining to the employment relationship includes the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1982) (estab-
lishing standards for certification of farm labor contractors); the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (1982) (establishing mechanism for
securing of pension rights); and the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-78 (1982) (creating regulatory and enforcement apparatus to maintain safety in the
workplace).
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The interplay of these statutes and the IRCA gives rise to two issues. The
first issue is whether undocumented workers are protected at all under federal
employment statutes. The second issue is what remedies are available if they
are protected. Potential remedies include cease and desist orders, back pay,
and reinstatement. The following paragraphs discuss these issues in turn.
Although Congress failed to include undocumented workers expressly as
within the class protected by federal employment laws, the legislative history
of the IRCA persuasively indicates that Congress considered undocumented
workers as generally protected by federal employment laws." In addition,
one IRCA provision authorizes appropriations to the Department of Labor
for enforcement of the FLSA against employers who "exploit" undocumented
workers.3 6 Finally, several lower courts and the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") have held that federal employment law does protect un-
documented workers. 7
The second issue, involving remedies for employment law violations, eludes
a definite answer. Congress has said only that the IRCA does not restrict
remedies available under "existing law.3" Existing law prior to the enactment
of the IRCA included a pronouncement by the Supreme Court that under
the NLRA, undocumented workers are not entitled to either reinstatement or
back pay.39 The Court suggested that, for undocumented workers, a cease
35. See H.R. REP. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649. The committee cited Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893
(1984), stating that the application of the NLRA "helps to assure that the wages and employment
conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien
employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment." 1986 U.S. CODE CONr.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5662. See also H.R. REP. No. 682(11), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 5757, 5758 (application of labor laws tends to limit
both "the hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on working conditions
caused by their employment").
36. See IRCA, § 111(d), 100 Stat. 3381 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. IV 1986)).
37. For cases finding no conflict with immigration policy where undocumented workers are
granted employment law protections, see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); Patel
v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2901 (1988); Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union
v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.
1979); Alvarez v. Sanchez, 105 A.D.2d 1114, 482 N.Y.S.2d 184 (4th Dept. 1984); Amay's Bakery
& Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 94 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1976). But cf. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 913
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("[i]t is unlikely that Congress intended the term 'employee' to include-
for purposes of being accorded the benefits of that protective statute-persons wanted by the
United States for the violation of our criminal laws"); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 171-72 (Jones,
J., dissenting) (allowing undocumented workers to recover for violations of the AWPA undercuts
purpose of prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 682(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5649, 5662; H.R. REp. No. 682(11), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5757, 5758.
39. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984) (reinstatement and back pay
contingent on employees' lawful presence in United States). But cf. id. at 912 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (by denying back pay to undocumented workers, Court is actually providing incentive
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and desist order requiring employers to stop the offending conduct is the
only appropriate relief.40 The NLRB has followed this language of the Su-
preme Court.4 ' However, the federal circuit courts which have considered the
issue have, in contrast to the NLRB, sought to distinguish the Supreme
Court's decision. 42 Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has resolved this
apparent conflict between the Court and the NLRB on the one hand, and
lower federal courts on the other.
Authority on both issues-the issue of employment law protections for
undocumented workers and the issue of remedies if undocumented workers
are covered-yields more confusion than certainty. Much of the confusion
stems from disagreement about how employment and immigration law inter-
act. Because of this current confusion, this Article will not focus on these
for employers to hire them). See also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S 1032, 1047 n.4 (1984)
(obiter dictum asserting that, "while he maintains the status of an illegal alien, the employee is
plainly not entitled to the prospective relief-reinstatement and continued employment-that
probably would be granted to other victims of similar unfair labor practices").
40. See Sure-Tan,. Inc., 467 U.S. at 904 n.13.
41. See NLRB v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987)
(NLRB must follow reviewing court' precedent). See generally Kubitschek, Social Security Ad-
ministration Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. Prrr.
L. REv. -(forthcoming 1989) (discussing problems with administrative agencies' nonacquiesc-
ence in circuit court decisions). But cf. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence By Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1988) (advancing justification for nonacquiescence
in specific contexts).
The General Counsel of the NLRB issued a memorandum on September 1, 1988, which made
the Board's position more generous toward undocumented workers. See Memorandum 88-89,
129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) (1988). In this memorandum, the General Counsel announced
that a grandfathered employee would be entitled to reinstatement unless the INS had
made a final determination that the employee was not lawfully present and entitled to work in
the United States. Back pay would be allowed for the period before the INS order. Non-
grandfathered employees, however, would not be entitled to reinstatement, and could receive
only limited, if any, back pay. See also Alexander, The Right of Undocumented Workers to
Reinstatement and Back pay in Light of Sure-Tan, Felbro, and the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANcE 125, 139-43 (1987-88) (discussing
General Counsel's position).
42. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (lth Cir. 1988) (distinguishing Sure-Tan
on ground that complainant in Sure-Tan sought back pay for loss of a job, while plaintiff in
Patel sought back pay only for work already performed); Local 512, Warehouse and Office
Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 715-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing Sure-Tan on
ground that Supreme Court dealt only with remedies available to persons no longer in the United
States); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local 638 of U.A., 860 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (2d
Cir. 1988) (same). See also Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986)
(declining to set aside as contrary to public policy arbitrator's award of reinstatement and back
pay to undocumented workers), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). But cf. Local 512, 795 F.2d
at 723-27 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (majority's view is inconsistent with Supreme Court's decision
in Sure-Tan); Bevies, 791 F. 2d at 1394 (Sneed, J., dissenting) (awarding reinstatement and back
pay to undocumented workers conflicts with immigration law and policy); Patel v. Sumani
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1531-35 (N.D. Ala. 1987.) (enforcement of FLSA against employers
of undocumented workers contravenes immigration policy), rev'd sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn
South, 846 F.2d 700 (1ith Cir. 1988).
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recent pronouncements in the case law and attempt to reconcile them. Instead,
it will focus on the root of the problem, attempting to discern the true cause
for the confusion and to suggest a resolution. Much of the confusion stems
from disagreements about how employment and immigration law interact.
Before analyzing this interaction as it affects employment law coverage and
remedies, it is worthwhile to consider the role of remedies in the enforcement
of employment law. The next section considers this topic.
II. THE ROLE OF REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
Remedies for violations of employment law generally have two principal
purposes: deterring wrongdoing and compensating victims. 43 These two pur-
poses often converge. Remedies such as back pay and reinstatement serve
both goals. However, a remedy which purports to deter wrongdoing without
compensating victims, such as a cease and desist order, may ultimately
accomplish neither end. Reliance solely on such remedies is therefore mis-
placed."
A hypothetical situation illustrates this point. Suppose an employer hires
employee X, an undocumented worker who is neither "grandfathered" in
under the IRCA employer sanctions provision, nor a prima facie amnesty
candidate. X is willing to work for less than the minimum wage, at least
initially. The employer, Slimy, Inc., a small garment manufacturing concern,
agrees to hire employee X, without engaging in the employment verification
process set out in the IRCA. Specifically, Slimy fails to request a visa,
passport, or any other documentation of X's immigration status. Slimy pays
X in cash at a rate below the minimum wage without accounting for the
transaction in its records. This procedure violates the FLSA. When X talks
one day with a friend, an American citizen, the friend tells X that compen-
sation below the minimum wage is illegal. X complains to his boss and is
fired immediately. What are X's rights and remedies?
If one considers only the policies behind the labor laws, the answer is
clear. The labor laws are designed to promote effective employee organization,
facilitate collective bargaining and industrial peace, and create a "floor" for
compensation, working hours, and conditions of employment. 45 When an
employer, like Slimy, Inc., violates provisions which serve these goals, the
wronged employee should be entitled to redress.4 Such redress would typically
43. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-23 (1975) (discussing purposes
of awarding back pay).
44. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Mendez, supra note 17, at 722 (discussing purposes of NLRA).
46. See, e.g., § 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (when NLRB finds that
employer committed an unfair labor practice, it may order reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay). See also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (permitting
government to sue for restitution on behalf of tenants subject to rents exceeding limits of wartime
price legislation). See generally Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASriNGS L.J. 665, 677-81 (1987) (reviewing
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include an equitable recovery representing the difference between the amount
of compensation the employee actually received and what he should have
received. This award of back pay makes whole the victim of labor law
violations. It also deters future wrongdoing by the employer. An employer
who knows that violations will, if detected, cost him the money that he
sought to save by paying illegally low wages will accordingly have less incentive
to engage in this kind of "frugality. '47 Thus, affording some measure of
monetary recovery to victims of violations encourages compliance with the
objectives of labor legislation.
Of course, compensatory remedies may not be the only way to secure
employer compliance with employment law norms. An injunction or a cease
and desist order barring future violations could also serve the compliance
goal, although it would not compensate victims. An injunction carries with
it the threat of penalties for contempt, including fines, if the enjoined party
violates the terms of the order. A purely injunctive remedy clearly has some
deterrent effect. But is an additional increment of deterrence added by the
prospect of a monetary recovery by the victim?
The answer to this question turns on the resolution of two variables: 1)
the remedy's deterrent value for violators or potential violators of the relevant
statute; and, 2) the prospect that the remedy will encourage employees to
come forward with reports of violations. Measured against these variables, a
monetary recovery is superior to a purely injunctive remedy.
Analysis of the effect of injunctive and monetary remedies supports this
conclusion. A hypothetical set of facts again illustrates the point. Suppose
Slimy, Inc. pays some of its employees at a rate one dollar below the minimum
wage. This violation of the FLSA continues undetected. If injunctive relief
is the only remedy available, Slimy, from a cost-benefit perspective, has little
literature on importance of redress and remedies to vindication of rights). Moral philosophy has
also emphasized the importance of redress. See AiSTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 141-42
(Ostwald ed. 1962). Rawls has observed that, "undeserved inequalities call for redress." J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 100 (1971). Although Rawls primarily considered the more
fundamental inequalities of birth and natural endowment, the crucial aspect of his analysis was
the affected individual's lack of control over his own destiny. Thus, inequalities caused by one
person, intentionally or unintentionally, taking value from another in violation of law should
ordinarily require redress because they clearly fall within Rawls' definition of "undeserved."
47. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-23 (1975) (authorizing back pay
as presumptive remedy for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1982)); Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (back pay available as
remedy for discrimination based on employee's filing complaint under FLSA). If the recovery is
greater than what a purely make-whole measure of relief would mandate-if, as the FLSA
requires, an offending employer must pay double the amount the employee should have received-
the court or agency more effectively reduces the incentive for illegal conduct. See FLSA, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). Commentators suggest that a greater than compensatory measure of
relief would enhance compliance with other legal norms, such as those governing the law of
contracts. See Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach
of Contract, 66 VA. L. Rav. 1443 (1980) (analyzing compensatory damages and their effect on
contract law).
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reason to reform its practices voluntarily. While Slimy maintains its illegal
compensation policy, it saves money. When and if Slimy is "caught" and
found to have violated the FLSA, under a regime providing only for injunctive
relief it is merely told to refrain from further violations of the statute. Slimy
is still ahead the money it saved initially due to its illegal conduct.
The foregoing analysis matters little if one believes that people and organ-
izations obey the law because it is the "right" thing to do. Another view is
possible, however. Holmes, for example, believed that people assessing whether
to conduct themselves in accordance with legal norms consider not only
whether a given norm is "right," but also assess the potential "downside"
of their non-conforming behavior. 48 Under this view, the difference in out of
pocket costs between monetary and injunctive relief becomes a significant
factor. If Slimy faces only the prospect of injunctive relief, it may take its
chances with initiating and continuing illegal conduct. 49 But if Slimy knows
that it risks paying out money equal to or representing some multiple of the
"saving" it realized by paying illegally low wages, it may seriously reconsider
the allure of noncompliance. 0
48. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 460-62 (1897). Cf. W. JAMES,
PRAGMATISM 42 (Meridian ed. 1970) ("[tlhe pragmatic method . . . is to try to interpret each
notion by tracing its respective practical consequences").
49. See Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employemnt Opportunity Comm'n, 458 U.S. 219, 228-29
(1982) (holding that defendant-employer's unconditional job offer to civil rights plaintiff tolls
accrual of back pay liability, relying in part on rationale that this rule will promote job offers);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (availability of back pay encourages
timely compliance). See also Mendez, supra note 17, at 730-31 (cease and desist orders ineffective
in promoting goals of NLRA); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1788 n.67 (1983) ("I know of no one
who claims that [a cease-and-desist order] by itself materially aids in the preservation of [the
group right to a free choice regarding collective bargaining].").
50. The prospect of monetary relief entails a greater magnitude of loss for the employer than
a cease and desist order which involves no out-of-pocket loss. Under Judge Learned Hand's
analysis, an actor faced with the potential for a greater magnitude of loss will or should, all
other things being equal, take greater steps to prevent the loss' occurrence. See United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Posner, A Theory of Negligence,
I J. LEGAI. STuD. 29, 32-33 (1972) (discussing Judge Hand's formulation). An employer facing
the greater out-of-pocket loss of a back pay award as compared with a cease and desist order,
therefore, has a greater incentive to comply with the law. See also infra notes 51-56 and
accompanying text (discussing other elements of Hand's analysis). On rare occasions, the mag-
nitude of a defendant's potential loss incurred through an award of monetary relief may persuade
a court to decline to order such relief, provided the court also believes that the defendant will
conform to the legal standard even without a compensatory remedy. See Arizona Governing
Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1110 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cost of awarding
compensatory relief to victims of systemic gender discrimination in pension plans militated against
providing such relief, given defendants' apparent willingness to comply with Court's holdings);
City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1978) (same).
But see P, MARGrs, RELLANCE, RELIEF, AND COST AVOmANCE: Tim PROBLEM OF REMEDIES
FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN PENSION AND BENEFIT PLANS 34-36 (1987) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author) (Manhart Court's rationale encourages abuse by defendants).
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Mention of "risk" brings to the surface the second element of our analysis
of deterrence: the incentive which a given remedy affords victims of labor
law violations to complain about their treatment. Cease and- desist orders
offer no incentive to victims beyond the knowledge that they have done the
"right" thing. Without incentives for victimized employees to come forward,
Slimy's FLSA violations will probably go undetected.5 As a rational economic
actor, Slimy considers the likelihood of detection as well as the severity of
sanctions for detected wrongdoing. 2 Slimy will grow bolder as the likelihood
of detection decreases. 3 This phenomenon clearly diminishes deterrence.
Calibrating remedies to provide incentives for victims to come forward is
particularly critical when one deals with victims who, like undocumented
workers, fear detection of their own illegal conduct. Undocumented workers
face deportation if their presence becomes known to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS"). Undocumented workers are reluctant to
report labor law violations because they fear their reporting of employer
misconduct will immediately bring them to the attention of the INS and result
in their deportation. 4
The addition of two features to the cadre of currently available labor law
rights and remedies can ease this fear and thereby increase deterrence. The
first feature is confidentiality. Under the FLSA, for example, agencies and
tribunals which process claims of substandard wages, wage discrimination or
retaliatory action by employers against undocumented workers who report
such illegality should be instructed to refrain from sharing these reports and
their sources with immigration authorities. If authorities cannot ensure con-
fidentiality, reports will not be forthcoming.
Confidentiality alone, however, will not assure the free flow of information.
Undocumented workers may believe that authorities' promises of confiden-
51. Compare Posner, supra note 50, at 48-49 (explaining role of damages in system of tort
adjudication as, in part, a device to encourage flushing out of information) with Hart, American
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, I I GA. L. REV.
969, 988 (1977) (describing Posner's account as "perhaps more ingenious than convincing").
52. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (prospective
tort defendant should consider both magnitude of loss, and probability of loss' occurrence). In
the context of remedies for violations of employment law, the probability of one having to
comply with a back pay award corresponds closely to the likelihood that one's wrongdoing will
be detected and brought to the attention of courts and agencies. See supra note 50 (discussing
back pay).
53. Cf. Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REv. 965, 982 n.36 (1984) (incentives to undercomply exist if potential defendant
believes he 'won't get caught') (quoting Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negli-
gence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 809-12 (1983)).
54. See supra notes 7-9. See also Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1437
("fear of deportation makes complaints unlikely"). Undocumented persons' fear of the INS has
also contributed to the lower-than-expected participation in the amnesty program established by
the IRCA. See, e.g., Tolchin, Amnesty for Aliens Might Be Extended, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1988, at A7, col. 1 (quoting Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) as indicating that "fear of the
immigration agency had scared many illegal aliens out of applying for amnesty").
19891
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
tiality are merely strategic moves to entice complainants out of anonymity.
When undocumented workers perceive that agencies eliciting their complaints
are acting strategically, they, too, will alter their behavior by refusing to come
forward." Eliciting victim cooperation requires more than merely an enforce-
ment authority's promise to forego the stick of INS notification; it also
requires a carrot.
The carrot extended in remedies for labor law violations committed against
undocumented workers should at least entail back pay or damages. The
potential for a cash return is partial consideration for the risk incurred by
undocumented workers who report labor law violations. While the availability
of monetary relief likely will not outweigh the perceived risk of deportation
for all undocumented workers, it should make a significant difference at the
margins . 6 Marginal increases in the willingness of this population to report
violations will soon have an impact on Slimy and its ilk. Increases in the rate
of reporting will enhance the likelihood that enforcement authorities will
detect Slimy's violations. This heightened probability of detection will help
deter Slimy.
The compensation for and deterrence of labor law violations afforded by
both a prohibitory injunction, which instructs the offending employer to
refrain from future violative conduct, and an award of monetary relief, which
obliges the employer to pay for his wrongdoing, also leave room for one
other basic remedy: reinstatement of the victims of labor law violations. From
the standpoint of compensation, reinstatement is vital. An employee who,
like the employee in our hypothetical situation, has been discharged because
he complained about violations of the FLSA should be restored to the position
he would have been in had the employer conformed his conduct to legal
norms." A monetary award certainly helps accomplish this goal; however,
the employee is only made truly whole if he is reinstated. 8
55. See generally D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11-18 (1979) (discussing difficulties for col-
lective action posed by strategic behavior). This reluctance may not evaporate even if undocu-
mented persons are persuaded of the government's sincerity. Sincerity does not rule out inadvertent
disclosure or disclosure by third parties such as the press. This risk might also deter a complainant
from volunteering information.
56. The margins are the starting point for implementation of any policy. See Easterbrook,
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 12-14 (1984) (discussing
how marginal changes in incentives will affect behavior if people are free to modify their conduct
to take advantage of incentives).
57. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976) (authorizing grant of
retroactive seniority to victims of racial discrimination in employment).
58. One may argue that providing both reinstatement and monetary relief to the non-
grandfathered employee in our hypothetical scenario does not so much compensate the undoc-
umented worker as reward him for his own illegal conduct in breaking the immigration laws.
The author discusses this issue later in this Article. See infra notes 183-98 and accompanying
text. If, however, one puts aside the immigration question temporarily in order to clarify the
analysis of labor law interests and issues, it should be clear that compensation is only complete
when a court or agency offers reinstatement to a discharged victim of labor law violations.
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Reinstatement is as essential as compensation to deterrence. Consider again
the two primary factors: 1) the impact on potential labor law violators; and,
2) the additional incentive for victims to complain. An employer confronting
a "troublemaking" employee who complains about labor law violations has
incentives to discharge that victim absent a guarantee of reinstatement. With
the troublemaker out of the way, the employer can hire a more compliant
worker and continue his wrongdoing.
The threat of a possible monetary award alone is insufficient to deter
employers. This is because the monetary award is limited to the amount of
compensation lost by the victim, or to some low multiple, usually two times
this amount. Moreover, the employer's potential liability does not include
any elements of an unpredictable magnitude, such as punitive damages. An
employer, therefore, may view a monetary award of predictable size, measured
by an employee's lost wages, as a cost of doing business-a license fee for
continuing illegality. 9 Because the initial complainant is gone, the previous
source of detection is no longer a problem. Other workers remain, but their
colleague's departure will certainly not promote their initiative in contacting
enforcement agencies.
The two key elements of deterrence analysis-the gravity of harm to the
wrongdoer weighed against the benefits of his wrongdoing, and the presence
of incentives for victims to come forward-underscore the importance of the
reinstatement remedy. As the previous analysis demonstrates, the lack of a
reinstatement remedy clearly encourages employers to avoid complying with
labor law norms. Reinstatement, therefore, complements back pay as a vital
remedy for employment law violations.
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW REMEDIES AND IMMIGRATION POLICY
A. Deterring Illegal Immigration
Immigration law and policy complicate the analysis of employment law
remedies for undocumented workers. The previous section established that
enforcement agencies must provide a full range of remedies-prohibitory
injunctions, monetary relief, and reinstatement-as well as a guarantee of
confidentiality, in order to secure optimal employer compliance with federal
labor and employment law mandates. Effective enforcement of employment
laws requires making all of the above remedies available to undocumented
workers in the three classes outlined above-grandfathered employees, am-
nesty candidates, and non-grandfathered employees-just as such remedies
are available to lawful employees. That prescription, however, presumes that
undocumented workers' immigration status is irrelevant to their rights under
59. Cf. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 53, at 989-94 (compensatory measure of damages
prevalent in contract law encourages undercompliance); Farber, supra note 47, at 1443 (under
purely compensatory measure of damages, "parties have an incentive to breach if the profits
from breach exceed the plaintiff's damages").
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American labor law. This section examines the soundness of that presumption.
Two related policy rationales support the presumption that immigration
status is irrelevant to employment law rights and remedies. First, applying
the NLRA to undocumented workers minimizes the detrimental impact of
competition from those employees on the wages and employment conditions
of lawful residents.60 Second, the extension of employment law remedies to
undocumented workers would lessen the competitive advantage that such
employees currently have over lawful residents, and thereby reduce the market
in the United States for undocumented labor. When domestic employer
demand for undocumented labor is low, the economic incentives which make
immigration an appealing option for undocumented persons are also re-
duced. 61 This phenomenon tends to reduce illegal immigration.
A hypothetical scenario demonstrates the plausibility of these justifications
for extending coverage of the NLRA to undocumented workers. Suppose an
employer, such as Slimy, Inc., can hire an undocumented person at $2.00
per hour. This amount is below the current minimum wage62 and, thus,
compensation at this level violates the FLSA. What happens if the undocu-
mented worker has no recourse to FLSA enforcement machinery? The con-
sequence of this condition is that the employer has little economic incentive
to comply with the FLSA in dealing with the undocumented worker. However,
substantial economic reasons compel Slimy, Inc. to comply with the FLSA
in dealing with lawful residents, who are covered by its provisions. All other
things being equal, if Slimy can freely pay illegally low wages to one group-
undocumented workers-but faces obstacles in effecting similar illegal econ-
omies with the other group-lawful residents-whom is Slimy most likely to
hire?
Under this hypothesis, lawful residents are less marketable than undocu-
mented persons in the eyes of employers. However, if the standing of both
groups under the FLSA is equalized, employers would have less reason to
prefer undocumented workers. This result eases downward pressure on em-
ployment opportunities, conditions, and compensation for lawful residents of
the United States.
Illegal immigration should decrease because of this scheme. As people of
countries in Latin America and Asia, whose residents frequently enter the
United States illegally, 63 receive information about reduced employment op-
60. See supra note 35.
61. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 5649-50 (employer sanctions provisions of IRCA designed to destroy
"magnet" of employment, which "lures" undocumented persons from their country of origin).
62. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (setting
minimum wage after December 31, 1980 at $3.35 an hour).
63. As of 1983, the 15 major source countries contributing to illegal immigration were
Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, the
Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Greece, India, Iran, and Nigeria. See Note, Developments in the
Law, supra note 3, at 1436 n.16.
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portunities here, they should become at least marginally less likely to emi-
grate. 64 Undocumented persons enter this country illegally because the benefits
of doing so outweigh the costs. The primary benefit is a job. 65 Diminishing
the likelihood of attaining a job renders the time, effort, expense and danger
of illegal entry a more significant deterrent to illegal immigration.
This Article suggests that employment law measures will not positively
affect immigration policy as long as these measures continue to focus on
avoiding any possibility of a reward for undocumented workers. Employment
law enforcement efforts will promote immigration policy when they focus on
punishing United States employers for violating the law. Changes in employer
attitudes and behavior regarding the hiring of undocumented labor are the
most effective means of implementing immigration policy because such changes
will effectively influence potential undocumented persons' immigration deci-
sions.
This distinction in whom the employment law should focus on assumes
that one can target legal and remedial norms to maximize deterrence of illegal
conduct. The premise which supports this notion is that a targeted group has
three basic attributes: 1) the capacity to acquire knowledge about the type of
conduct which society forbids and what sanctions attach upon proof that a
party has engaged in such behavior;66 2) the capacity to shape its conduct to
64. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893-94 (1984) ("if the demand for undocu-
mented aliens declines, there may then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter in
violation of the federal immigration laws"); Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union
v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 720 (9th Cir. 1986) ("equalizing the back pay liability for unlawful acts
against undocumented and American workers could deter employers from hiring undocumented
workers and thus marginally reduce illegal entry to the United States"); Note, After the IRCA,
supra note 16, at 610 (labor law protections would act together with the IRCA's employer
sanctions provisions to further immigration concerns).
There is some empirical basis for this theory, if one extrapolates from data involving legal
immigration. Legal immigration decreases when United States employer demand slackens for a
protracted period. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 52 ("at the height of the
Great Depression . 35,576 entered the country, over 100,000 [including temporary immigrants]
left").
It seems likely that some information about economic opportunity is available in nations where
illegal immigration originates. Correspondence flows from compatriots, friends, and relatives
already in the United States. Those who do not directly receive correspondence can still glean
information from contact with recipients, from the media within their country, and from the
pungent mill of rumor. Assuming, therefore, that employment opportunities in fact decrease
appreciably, news of this decrease should be disseminated to those living in other countries to
the extent that such information pushes illegal immigration downward.
65. See H. REP. No. 682 (I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CoNo.
& ADmN. NEws 5649-50 (prospect of employment is "magnet that lures [undocumented workers]
to this country"); D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 4, at 66 ("almost three-quarters
(74.2%) of all respondents in the study group [of apprehended undocumented workers] reported
that they came to the United States in order to find a job"); Fogel, supra note 3, at 76 ("incentive
[for illegal immigration] is a job").
66. Cf. G. CAzARasi, THm CosTs OF ACcIDENTS: A LEoAL AND ECONowc ANALYsis 148-49
(1970) (discussing importance of access to information in reducing accident costs).
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avoid the illegality and sanctions; and, 3) the existence of a sufficient "fit"
between the behavior which triggers sanctions and the behavior which the
sanctions are designed to deter. Targeting a group which lacks any of these
features will only frustrate deterrence.
The interaction of immigration and labor law highlights the importance of
these three basic attributes. The activities Congress seeks to deter are: 1)
illegal immigration; and, 2) the hiring of undocumented workers by domestic
employers. The following subsections analyze how control of those activities
fares under the three criteria just outlined. Discussion will focus on the
imposition of two alternative and mutually exclusive sanctions on two distinct
groups. The first strategy involves subjecting employers who violate the labor
laws in their treatment of undocumented workers to liability under the full
spectrum of remedies available under current federal labor and employment
law. The second strategy-and the current approach-involves subjecting
undocumented workers to the risk of employer violations of otherwise ap-
plicable federal labor law without giving these employees full recourse to
rights and remedies. 67 Under this Article's hypothesis, the first strategy should
deter employers from hiring undocumented workers, and thereby reduce illegal
immigration.
1. Capacity to Acquire Knowledge
The first factor to consider is the employer's, as compared with the
undocumented worker's, capacity to acquire knowledge about prohibited
conduct and applicable sanctions. This capacity is important because sanctions
have virtually no impact as a deterrent if a given party does not know of
their existence. This does not mean that all parties who lack knowledge of
sanctions will engage in behavior which the sanctions aim to deter. However,
a party who lacks knowledge of sanctions cannot be affected by them before
he acts and, therefore, will not be deterred from acting. Sanctions which fail
to deter are virtually useless. 68
Employers' capacity to acquire knowledge is typically superior to the
capacity of undocumented workers. First, employers are often, although not
67. This second sanction may seem less direct than the first: no out-of-pocket expenditures
are required, and the subject of the sanction-the undocumented worker-loses nothing which
he had not lost previously. These points reflect the weakness of the sanction, which this Article
discusses in greater detail infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. One's denial of employment
law remedies for undocumented workers is a sanction, however, regardless of its effectiveness.
68. Sanctions which are not useful as effective deterrents before the fact may still serve a
symbolic purpose after the fact by demonstrating to the rest of society that legal standards have
been upheld. This is one justification for the death penalty. See Perlin, The Supreme Court,
The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden
Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss?, " 29 ARJz. L. REv. 1, 3 n.9 (1987). The appropriateness of
this justification is subject to intense debate. Id. See also infra notes 203-15 and accompanying
text (discussing symbolic dimension of employment law remedies for undocumented workers).
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always, entities or organizations. As such, they enjoy actual or potential
economies of scale that permit specialization and division of labor. 69 Organ-
izations typically have some research capability which allows them to ascertain
the current state of the law. Organizations also typically have access to legal
advice, either from in-house or retained counsel. Attorneys hired by employer
clients to dispense advice on labor and immigration matters could inform
their clients of the full range of sanctions and remedies available to undo-
cumented workers under federal employment law as advocated in this Article.
Conveying this information should discourage employers from hiring undo-
cumented workers.
A second factor which enhances employers' access to information about
undocumented workers' employment rights and remedies is the local availa-
bility of such information. Even if some employers are too small to enjoy
organizational benefits such as specialization, they have access to the popular
media, which reports regularly on immigration and labor matters. 70 Moreover,
employers, because of their work-related interest, are more likely than the
public at large to spot and retain such information. 71
Undocumented workers, on the other hand, have considerably fewer sources
of information. They are typically poor, isolated, and relatively lacking in
education. 72 Because of their isolation, they do not have the same capacity
to gather data that is enjoyed by more organized actors, including many
employers.
73
The relative disadvantage of undocumented workers is exacerbated by their
geographic situation at the time when the information would have the most
impact, i.e., while they are still in their countries of origin, considering
69. Organizations are typically in a better position than individuals to collect, analyze, and
act on information. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 66, at 55-58; Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic
Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1985); Jost, From
Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV.
1101, 1138-39 (1986); Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV.
511, 548-49 (1986). Cf Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-95 (1977) (risk of loss should be borne
by party better able to assess both the probability that risk will materialize and the magnitude
of loss if risk does materialize).
70. See, e.g., Applebome, Amnesty for Aliens: The Curtain Rings Down to Some Mixed
Reviews, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
71. Cf A. TvERSKY & D. KAHNEMAN, AVAILABILITY: A HEURISTIC FOR JUDGING FREQUENCY
AND PROBABILITY, IN JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEUISICS AND BIASES 164, 176 (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) (personal experience affects availability of scenarios
to individual memory).
72. See D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 4, at 73-76, 92-94, 115-34 (discussing
education, English-speaking ability, and wage data of a sample of undocumented workers).
73. In contrast to organizations, most individuals lack the resources to discover and assess
information about risk. This is one reason why the legal system does not always rely on individuals
to decide whether they should secure their own insurance but, instead, makes insurance com-
pulsory in crucial areas, such as automobile collision and liability. See G. CALABREsI, supra note
66, at 55-58.
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whether or not to attempt illegal entry into the United States. At this critical
juncture, potential undocumented workers have virtually no access to media
generated in the United States except through second-hand reports in indig-
enous news sources about United States developments. While some news
about employer sanctions and the IRCA generally may filter through, news
about developments regarding rights and remedies under United States em-
ployment law will not be readily available in undocumented workers' countries
of origin.7 4 If one assumes that information about the exclusion of undocu-
mented workers from labor law protections would deter potential undocu-
mented workers from emigrating, 7 then this deterrence is surely limited by
the reduced capacity of such persons to acquire that information. 76
2. Capacity to Conform Conduct
Having established that employers are likely to have greater access to
information than undocumented workers, the next factor to consider is the
actors' capacity to conform their conduct so as to avoid sanctions arising
from the employment of undocumented workers. One's capacity to conform
74. It is possible that reports about the employment situation generally, or the situation
specifically pertaining to undocumented workers, will penetrate these foreign markets. Rumor
and correspondence will also play a role. The pervasiveness of rumor and the rarity of corre-
spondence will generally increase when the potential undocumented population is illiterate.
Rumor, because it comes from persons second-hand or even more remote, is inherently less
precise than first-hand correspondence. Information of greater sophistication and complexity,
such as information about employment law remedies, will tend to get lost in the jumble.
75. Potential immigrants' knowledge of a lack of employment law protections in the United
States might not deter illegal immigration if the fit is loose between the absence of employment
law protections and the potential immigrants' main motivation for immigrating illegally. Since
the principal motivation for illegal entry is finding a job-any job, see supra note 65 and
accompanying text-the fact that a job comes without employment law protections may not
make a difference to undocumented persons. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
76. Cf. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 625, 630-34, 637-39 (1984) (making the complementary point that high
visibility of exceptions to general rule of liability or culpability, such as exception as a result of
duress, weakens deterrence by fostering impression that one may "get away with" violations of
norms); Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263, 1280-84 (1985) (same).
Undocumented persons' lack of access to information also punctures the reward theory, which
holds that a system which makes remedies available to undocumented workers rewards illegal
immigration. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing reward theory). For
example, individuals often post a reward to achieve an objective, such as the apprehension of a
suspected criminal. But widespread knowledge of the reward is vital to accomplishing the goal.
If people know about the reward, they have an incentive to contribute information. If no one
knows about the reward, the reward fails to serve as an incentive. Absent knowledge, the only
role of the reward is the role of an after-the-fact windfall. Similarly, in immigration decisions,
if people do not know about employment law protections in the United States before they
emigrate, such protections are not a reward for illegal immigration in the instrumental sense.
Employment protections which workers did not anticipate before their illegal entry into the
United States are not a reward, but a serendipitous occurrence.
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to the legal standard is important because sanctions cannot effectively deter
behavior which an individual or entity is unable to change. 7
When considering the capacity of others to conform their conduct, it is
useful to distinguish between physical and mental capacity, on the one hand,
and economic capacity, on the other. Employers may have superior resources
which enhance their capacity to conform in this area. The comparison between
employers and undocumented workers here, however, admittedly produces
more ambiguity than does the same comparison under the access-to-infor-
mation factor.
Most employers clearly have the physical and mental ability to take basic
steps to guard against employing undocumented workers. One may assume
that employers are, as a group, at least as cognitively sound as the rest of
the population. Employers, therefore, should not suffer from the lack of
cognition or responsibility which may serve to excuse illegal acts under the
criminal law. 7s An employer may conform its conduct to existing law by
instituting the procedures mandated by the IRCA: she can verify the em-
ployee's residence or citizenship by requiring the employee or prospective
employee to produce a passport, a green card, or another document which
adequately serves the purpose of verification.
The ambiguity in this apparently precise rendering derives from economic,
not mental or physical, factors. A hypothetical scenario depicts the extent of
the difficulty in this area. Let us assume first that, as seems likely, the
employer sanctions of the IRCA lose some impact because of government
officials' less than total enforcement.7 9 Larger corporations may still obey the
law. These firms may have sufficient cash flow and profit margins to employ
organized labor, even if it diverts profits from shareholders to unions. Such
77. The classic case of being unable to conform conduct is the case in which a criminal
defendant is found not responsible for a criminal act because she suffered from -a mental disease
or defect which prevented her from appreciating the wrongfulness of her acts. See American Bar
Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 7 MENTAL DIsAnaITY L. REP. 136, 138 (1983)
(discussing rationale for insanity defense).
78. See supra note 77.
79. The INS has cited and sought to fine employers when a court or agency found that they
have violated the IRCA. See, e.g., Filkins, Businessman Faces Fine for Hiring Illegals, The
Miami Herald, Jan. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Statistics regarding detected wrongdoing can be
invidious. The numbers of detected and apprehended wrongdoers may be large in an absolute
sense. This also is true of the number of undocumented persons apprehended by the INS. See
J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA 98-106 (1983) (cited in T. ALaINIKOF & D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 756, 758 (number
of INS apprehensions of undocumented persons hovers around 1,000,000 annually)). The ap-
prehension statistics do not reflect the INS' enforcement success, however. The statistics suggest
instead that prospective undocumented persons think so little of the enforcement machinery
which is currently in place that they continue to attempt to best it in massive numbers. By all
accounts, they succeed. See T. ALEINKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 760 (INS agents'
estimates of ratio of apprehended to unapprehended undocumented persons range from 1:2 to
1:10). The same phenomenon may therefore occur with respect to government enforcement of
the IRCA.
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corporations may also be able to pay all employees at a rate equal to or
above the minimum wage. In addition, the bigness of the corporation may
make it more visible, and heighten its chances of being targeted for enforce-
ment by IRCA authorities even under an imperfect enforcement regime. Thus,
for the big corporation, the combination of some level of IRCA enforcement
and some degree of labor law protection for undocumented workers makes
it economically worthwhile to hire only American citizens or lawful residents.
Smaller firms applying this economic calculus may reach quite a different
result. A small business owner may confront a choice between risking sanc-
tions through labor law and IRCA violations, and surrendering her shop to
creditors. Many firms with, for instance, less than 100 employees (an admit-
tedly arbitrary boundary of smallness) now employ undocumented workers.
These businesses typically include textile and garment manufacturers, retail
establishments, and restaurants. Such businesses have limited cash flow and
tight profit margins. Without the advantages of docile, low-wage undocu-
mented labor, their cash flow may trickle down to a few drops and their
profit margins may shrink to nothing. Because these businesses are relatively
small, they are less prominent on the enforcement horizon and accordingly
they have less reason to fear detection. Many small businesses, therefore, will
assume the slight risk of sanctions.
The reaction of these small businesses to possible sanctions under federal
labor law and the IRCA may result in these businesses doing one or more
of the following: 1) hiring even more ignorant and raw undocumented workers
than was previously the case in order to minimize the chance that employees
will assert their rights under federal law; 2) paying these employees even less
to compensate for the risks which they as employers run;80 or, 3) footing the
bill for ersatz residence or citizenship documentation because they can arrange
for forged papers cheaper than the cost of paying the minimum wage or
dealing with labor unions.8 1 Under this scenario, such employers lack the
economic capacity to conform their conduct. The threat of government
imposed sanctions does not significantly curb employment of undocumented
workers in this realm. Illegal immigration, which correlates with job availa-
bility, persists.
As one considers economic factors as one element of employers' capacity
to stop hiring undocumented workers, the analysis indicates that the effect-
iveness of sanctions may vary with the size and resources of the employer.
In some cases, sanctions will not be effective. This does not mean that we
should, as a matter of immigration policy, decline to sanction employers for
conduct which would otherwise violate federal employment law.
80. Cf. Applebome, Aliens Who Are Still Illegal Find Life Is Getting Tougher, N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1988, at Al, A12, col. I ("the work that aliens find is often the most marginal, low-
paying work to be found").
81. Cf. Schuck, supra note 2, at 77 & n.434 (discussing ease with which one may obtain
fraudulent documents); Applebome, supra note 80, at 12 (same).
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The alternative to imposing liability upon employers for employment law
violations is to make undocumented workers bear the risk of employer
violations of employment law. This alternative, however, becomes feasible
only if undocumented workers as a group are better able than employers to
conform their behavior so as to reduce illegal immigration. If undocumented
workers are not better situated than employers in this respect, the effectiveness
of targeting undocumented workers erodes proportionately.
Some judges and commentators view undocumented persons as possessing
a formidable capacity to conform their conduct.8 2 As is the case with em-
ployers, undocumented workers presumably possess the physical and mental
abilities to control their actions. It seems doubtful that persons inadvertently
move to the United States because they are unsure of the exact location of,
say, the Mexican-American border. Persons come to live in the United States
primarily for two reasons: 1) economic betterment, and, 2) political freedom.
Identifying these concerns, however, does not in and of itself demonstrate
that prospective illegal immigrants have the capacity to conform their conduct
to avoid sanctions. Prudence counsels a more searching analysis before
embracing this conclusion.
Persons who choose to immigrate to the United States in pursuit of political
freedom pose the greatest challenge to the notion that undocumented persons
can conform their conduct. This is particularly true when one considers those
fitting into the political asylum category. These immigrants have, by defini-
tion, suffered and risk continued suffering from governmental persecution
directed at them and their families. Faced with death, torture, or unjust
imprisonment in their countries of origin, they choose flight. Their choice to
immigrate does not evidence any notable capacity to calibrate choices based
upon incentives. The incentive of life itself overshadows any other risks and
benefits. Such a motivation leads to but one outcome: immigration to the
82. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 913, 913 n.* (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(curbing employment law remedies for undocumented workers "provides less incentive for aliens
to enter and reenter the United States illegally"); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 171, 172 (5th Cir.
1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[t]o the extent [that] the . . . prohibition [in AWPA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1801, 1816 (1982)) on hiring undocumented aliens is intended to discourage illegal migration
of farm workers from other countries, that purpose is undercut by allowing those farm workers
to sue and recover benefits on a par with legally employed workers"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2901 (1988); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) (Sneed, J.,
dissenting) (extending employment law remedies to undocumented workers conflicts with policy
of discouraging illegal immigration which underlies immigration laws); Patel v. Sumani Corp.,
Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1534-35 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (curbing remedies curbs illegal immigration),
rev'd sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Schuck, supra note
2, at 76-77 ("Immigration law deals with private activity that is quintessentially deliberate and
calculating, activity therefore in which incentives are highly and directly salient to motivation.").
But see Comment, Human Rights, supra note 16, at 1742 (since prime motivation for those
entering United States illegally is opportunity to enjoy general economic conditions which are
superior to those of the persons' countries of origin, "declining to enforce employment standards
for illegal aliens simply does not reduce illegal immigration").
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
United States. Persons in this category, therefore, will not conform their
conduct.
There is also some question regarding undocumented persons' economic
motivations for illegal immigration. For the most part, undocumented work-
ers, assuming they have access to information, should react in a manner
similar to domestic employers. If the potential economic advantage is great
and detection of wrongdoing, once here, is not definite, the temptation for
them to enter or stay in the United States illegally is very strong. Yet, this
situation does not mean that undocumented workers have no capacity to
avoid illegal immigration. In theory, at least, the situation demands only the
design and implementation of sanctions strong enough to alter a prospective
undocumented worker's positive assessment of the economic advantage yielded
by illegal immigration. Imposing sanctions which sufficiently shrink that
advantage will alleviate the problem. This point leads to the third component
of our analysis.
3. The Fit Between Sanctions and Prohibited Conduct
The focus of the third component is on the fit between the proposed
sanction and the conduct one wishes to curb. A close relation between
sanctions and prohibited conduct is vital to deterrence. Deterrence results
only when sanctions neutralize the benefits of prohibited behavior for the
sanctions' targeted group. If an activity which triggers sanctions is unrelated
to the behavior which one wishes to deter, such sanctions will not deter the
targeted behavior. s3
The shaping of effective sanctions to curb illegal immigration is particularly
challenging. Illegal immigration results from a network of economic, social,
and political factors which do not recognize the boundaries of nations. This
section examines the question of fit, first as it applies to employers and
second, as it applies to undocumented workers.
Imposing sanctions on employers by fully extending the reach of employ-
ment law to undocumented workers fits Congress' express goal of curbing
undocumented workers' employment opportunities. Certain statutes, such as
the NLRA, the FLSA, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"),
feature an almost perfect fit. Our old hypothetical scenario about Slimy, Inc.
and the exploitation of undocumented labor demonstrates this point. Slimy
has little incentive to hire undocumented workers if it knows that it will not
be able to save money by pressuring these employees not to organize, paying
them less, working them more, and exposing them to dangerous working
83. For example, suppose one wanted to deter murder. The government's placing of a tax
on the manufacture of shoelaces would have no effect on the incidence of intentional homicides.
One's manufacture of shoelaces has nothing to do with homicide, even though many killers
probably wear shoelaces. Regulation of the manufacture and sale of firearms might be a better
bet. Cf. G. CALAxRsi, supra note 66, at 133, 140-43 (causal relationship between activities of
entity bearing costs of accidents and accidents' occurrence is necessary to promote deterrence).
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conditions which cost money to correct. If courts and agencies made full
labor law remedies available to undocumented workers, these employees
would have an incentive to inform the relevant authorities of Slimy's illegal
conduct. This increase in the likelihood of Slimy's conduct being detected
should lessen its interest in hiring undocumented workers.
Under other statutes, however, the fit between making remedies for em-
ployment law violations available to undocumented workers and reducing
employer demand for such labor may be more tenuous. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act is one such statute. A hypothetical situation again illustrates this
point.
Suppose that Slimy employs twenty undocumented workers in its textile
factory, along with twenty legal resident employees. Slimy pays the legal
residents $6.00 per hour. It pays the undocumented workers $5.00 per hour.
Under this regime, for each undocumented worker it hires Slimy realizes a
saving of $1.00 per hour. The undocumented employees' competitive edge
induces employers to hire more from this population. This result frustrates
the goals of the IRCA.
However, while Slimy violates the IRCA employer sanctions provisions, it
probably does not violate federal employment law. Title VII, which bars
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, or national origin, may
not reach this conduct. If one assumes that all of the undocumented workers
are of 'the same nationality, for instance, Burmese, it will be difficult for
those employees to demonstrate that the employers discriminated against them
because they. are Burmese and not because they are undocumented workers.
An employer who discriminates against undocumented workers solely on the
basis of alienage with respect to wages does not violate Title VII.
4
However, these employees could recover under Title VII if they could prove
that they were part of a larger group of Asians, including lawful residents
or citizens, whom Slimy paid less. But suppose that Slimy paid all lawful
residents and citizens at the same rate regardless of their race, religion,
gender, and national origin, and reserved the lower rate for undocumented
workers. Slimy would most likely not be liable under Title VII. In this case,
Title VII does not diminish employer incentives to hire from the undocu-
mented population.
There are other scenarios in which the fit between Title VII protections
and curbing illegal immigration seems less tenuous. In these situations, an
employer engages in conduct which is discriminatory under the statute, but
which results in no direct pecuniary advantage to the employer. This lack of
pecuniary advantage is a problem if one posits that employers tend to hire
undocumented workers because they want to save money. Providing remedies
for behavior which may be illegal, but which results in no cost savings to
then employer, may not further the goals of immigration law. Another hy-
pothetical situation demonstrates this point.
84. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (discrimination based on alienage
not covered under Title VII).
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Suppose Slimy employs ten undocumented workers of Hispanic origin, as
well as ten lawful resident workers with the same ethnic background. Although
all twenty employees are capable and diligent, Slimy refuses to consider them
for promotion. Slimy promotes only white employees. This practice clearly
violates Title VII. However, the practice seems to be neutral in its effect on
immigration policy because it does not appear to save the employer money.
The employer's lack of a pecuniary rationale sets the no-promotion policy
apart from cost-cutting strategies like avoiding union organizing through
intimidation, which violates the NLRA, and refusing to pay overtime to
undocumented workers, which should violate the FLSA. Providing remedies
for undocumented workers victimized by the no-promotion policy may help
eradicate discrimination. But will it help curb illegal immigration by making
employers less willing to hire undocumented workers? The answer is "yes,"
although the rationale behind the answer is less obvious than it is for the
NLRA and the FLSA violations.
The rationale for finding a fit between employment law remedies and
immigration policy in this kind of situation stems from the psychology of
the employer. An employer may view discriminatory job practices subjectively
as premised on pecuniary factors. For example, an employer may believe that
nondiscriminatory promotion practices would hurt his business because such
practices would force greater contact between white customers and non-white
employees whom he promoted into positions with more customer contact.
This contact may offend white customers who themselves hold discriminatory
attitudes. 5 These customers might go elsewhere, rather than deal with non-
white employees. An employer who knew he could implement his discrimi-
natory hiring plan by hiring undocumented workers outside of Title VII's
ambit might therefore tend to hire members of that population.
An employer might also have interests beyond strictly pecuniary advantage
which he could serve by employing undocumented workers who lacked re-
course through employment law. For instance, an employer might be inclined
toward sexual harassment of employees.8 6 If the employer has a captive
workforce of undocumented workers, the employer may indulge his whims
without legal accountability.8 7
85. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (rejecting argument
that neighbors who opposed others' establishment of group home for mentally retarded persons
would fear residents of such home when argument was unaccompanied by proof of reasonable
basis for such fear); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (rejecting argument that society
generally disfavored children from racially mixed households as a valid basis for state to remove
child from custody of white mother who was cohabiting with black male).
86. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that sexual
harassment violates Title VII).
87. In Freudian terms, this employer would be giving in to his id, rather than heeding to
the rational counsel of his ego. See S. FREuD, THE Eo AND THE ID 15 (Norton ed. 1962) ("the
pleasure principle . . . reigns unrestrictedly in the id"). Cf. F. NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 196 (Anchor ed. 1956) ("pleasure is induced by . . . being
able to exercise . . . power freely upon one who is powerless . . . the pleasure of rape").
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Another nonpecuniary interest which the employer may act to preserve is
her freedom to discriminate. Such freedom is, after all, of noble pedigree;
noted scholars vigorously defended one's right to discriminate in the face of
judicial movement toward integration.88 Protecting the freedom.to discrimi-
nate is also convenient. In order to eschew discrimination one must exercise
self-restraint and tolerate cultural and social differences. One must also strive
to acquire knowledge in an attempt to overcome stereotypes and mispercep-
tions. 9 This is strenuous work. Employers may also resent the demands of
outside authorities that they educate themselves. If an employer could hire
undocumented workers and thereby preserve her own authority and save
herself the tedium of enlightenment, she might take advantage of such an
opportunity. Extending the protections of discrimination law to undocu-
mented workers would discourage such behavior. Therefore, such action fits
well with immigration policy, even when direct pecuniary advantage for the
employer is not present.
Before one concludes that making employment law remedies available to
undocumented workers is worthwhile as a matter of immigration policy,
however, one must consider the fit between immigration policy and the
opposite approach-subjecting undocumented employees to the risk of irre-
mediable employer illegality. What effect would leaving undocumented work-
ers remediless have on illegal immigration? Because there is only a very loose
fit between the sanction of subjecting such workers to irremediable employ-
ment law violations and their individual decisions to enter or stay in the
United States illegally, this sanction will not be an effective deterrent.
The question of fit between employment and immigration law as it relates
to undocumented workers is a challenging one because it is not clear what
type of direct sanction against undocumented workers would deter persons
from entering the United States illegally. The tightest fit would result if one
made the act of work for pay in the United States a crime for undocumented
workers. Under such a scheme, an undocumented worker whom authorities
found to have worked in the United States would be subject to a fine,
imprisonment, or both. However, there are fundamental problems with such
a strategy.
The problem with the system allowing punishment for the undocumented
person who works in the United States is twofold. First, sanctions of this
88. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
31-34 (1959) (discussing constitutional status of racial integration in light of, inter alia, associa-
tional rights of people who favor segregation).
89. See Donahue, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to
Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 527-28 (1987) (discussing "psychic costs" borne by
discriminatory employer when law forces him to associate with employees he dislikes because of
employees' race). See also Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 513, 516 (1987) (asserting that efficiency might justify lower standard of compensation for
black employees, who may, due to their past exclusion from equal education opportunities, be
less productive on average than white workers).
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type are surplusage: the INA makes mere illegal entry into the United States
a crime and a deportable offense. 90 Efforts to enforce this provision currently
center on the workplace. 9' Congress has not solved the problem through these
efforts, which is why it enacted the IRCA. Second, if we imprison undocu-
mented persons in the United States, taxpayers consequently subsidize rather
expensive, if not posh, accommodations for those persons. 92 Immigration
policy should prevent or minimize such transfers of resources.93 These two
cavils demonstrate the futility of close fitting sanctions against undocumented
persons for working in this country.
Sanctions with a looser fit are equally ineffective. The looser fitting sanction
that this Article focuses on at this point involves subjecting undocumented
workers to the risk of working in the United States without employment law
protections. This risk might dissuade a foreign national from illegally immi-
grating if her key motivation for immigrating was to avail herself of these
legal protections. A foreign national whose prime aim in entering this country
illegally is to bask under the umbrella of the NLRA, the FLSA, or Title VII
might well hesitate if Congress or the courts took away any portion of the
umbrella. For most, if not all, undocumented workers, however, this umbrella
is irrelevant. People enter the United States to work. 94 As long as work in
the United States is available and more remunerative than work in the worker's
country of origin, the exodus will continue. 9
Denying undocumented workers all employment rights and remedies would
not modify either of the factors which presently encourage illegal immigration,
nor would it reduce employment opportunities for this population. In fact,
the opposite is the case. By freeing employers from the worrisome mandates
of minimum wages, maximum hours, unionization, and non-discrimination,
we simply encourage employers to hire undocumented workers. Additionally,
employment law mandates do not account for the superiority of American
compensation levels over positions in countries of origin. Even without
employment law protections, American jobs-and the most undesirable Amer-
90. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a summary of the statutes which make
certain forms of immigration illegal.
91. The INS has concentrated much of its efforts on investigating factories and staging raids
at those and other workplaces in order to apprehend undocumented workers. See Bracamonte,
supra note 17, at 39-43.
92. See Zaldivar, INS Parole Papers Won't Guarantee All Cubans Will Get Speedy Releases,
The Miami Herald, Jan. 10, 1988, at 7A ("the cost of keeping the Cubans incarcerated is much
higher than the cost of placing them in halfway houses or with sponsors"). Indeed, even the
cost of apprehending and deporting all undocumented persons in the United States is prohibitive.
This cost was one factor favoring the amnesty program, which ultimately reduces the number
of people that the INS must apprehend. See Mazzoli, supra note 19, at 42.
93. See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
94. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982); supra note 65 and accompanying text.
95. This conclusion comports with fundamental economic theory. See generally D. MUELLER,
supra note 55, at 125-42 (discussing how people tend to vote with their feet by moving to
communities where "goods" such as employment opportunities are widely available).
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ican jobs at that-offer compensation substantially superior to jobs which a
prospective illegal immigrant would typically attain in her country of origin.96
This simple fact is sufficient to motivate most undocumented persons to
immigrate. The availability of United States employment law protections, like
the availability of United States public education for noncitizen children of
undocumented persons, is merely gravy.97 Even if the pool of prospective
undocumented workers knows about these protections,98 the availability of
employment law protections only supplements the other factors which make
jobs in the United States more appealing. 99 Removing these protections will
not appreciably reduce illegal immigration as long as the disparity in com-
pensation levels remains so great.
96. See D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUrN, supra note 4, at 55-64. The authors note, for example,
that "the minimum weekly wage in Colombia is almost identical to the minimum wage for an
hour of work in the U.S." Id. at 61. In other words, an undocumented worker in the United
States making less than the hourly minimum wage would still probably make far more than he
could make at an average wage, above the minimum, in source countries such as Mexico, El
Salvador, or Colombia. See id. at 62 (presenting chart depicting average and minimum wages in
United States and selected countries of origin).
97. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) ("[tlhe dominant incentive for illegal entry
. is the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country . . .
in order to avail themselves of a free education."). But see Schuck, supra note 2, at 56-57
(observing that Plyler Court's scrutiny of efficacy of means (barring undocumented persons'
children from public education) to accomplish end (reduction of illegal immigration) is inconsistent
with deference Court usually accords regulatory statutes). Professor Schuck's point may, however,
be less applicable when one is interpreting an ambiguous or silent statute, such as every example
of federal employment legislation, rather than determining whether a clear statute like the Texas
education law in Plyler violates the Constitution. The Texas statute expressly excluded undocu-
mented alien children while there is no such express exclusion anywhere in federal employment
legislation. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205. The efficacy of such an exclusion in reducing illegal
immigration is one factor which should govern imputing to Congress the purpose of creating
such an exclusion. If an implied exception to general statutory language does not clearly serve
the purpose of that or any other statute, the Court would be best advised to leave the question
to Congress' future consideration. See infra notes 113-39 and accompanying text (discussing
limits placed on courts' authority to read exceptions into broad statutory language based on
institutional factors such as courts' non-accountability).
98. It is doubtful that most people in their countries of origin have significant knowledge of
United States employment law. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the information sources in these countries.
99. It is possible that the availability of labor law protections to all persons employed in the
United States would exert a marginal influence on potential undocumented persons' decisions to
illegally enter the United States. Such activity at the margins is not insignificant, as a general
matter. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Here, however, the marginal effect should be
minuscule because the possibility that one may get a job in the United States which does not
carry with it the protection of employment law is still very attractive to illegal immigrants, who
are typically accustomed to a radically lower standard of living, See supra note 96 and accom-
panying text.
The question of fit between sanction and disfavored conduct for undocumented workers and
domestic employers may be closer if one examines an aspect of employment law which is
tangential to this Article: the limits of unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance, which
pays benefits to workers involuntarily out of a job, is a cooperative federal-state program.
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This analysis demonstrates that sanctions directed at employers will more
effectively reduce illegal immigration than will sanctions which directly target
Employees contribute to the program, as do employers, who pay a tax based on the employer's
total payroll and the number of former employees collecting unemployment insurance. See The
Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA"), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The
greater the number of employees collecting benefits, the greater the employer's tax. See 26
U.S.C. § 3303(a)(1) (1982). Employees who leave a job as a result of substandard working
conditions are viewed by courts as having been constructively discharged and they are therefore
eligible for benefits. E.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Arteaga, 735 P.2d 473, 481 (Colo. 1987).
The FUTA prohibits the government from distributing benefits to undocumented persons. 26
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1982). This prohibition disposes of the issue of undocumented persons'
eligibility under current law, but leaves open the question of the desirability of this rule as a
matter of immigration policy. The fit factor helps in the analysis of this issue.
Many undocumented persons have intimate knowledge of the unemployment situation in their
country of origin. See D. NORTH & M. HousroUt, supra note 4, at 62 (chart showing, for
example, that unemployment in Mexico totals 40%). The prospect of their receiving benefits to
tide them over during periods of unemployment would seem to be highly appealing to potential
undocumented persons. If undocumented persons were eligible for unemployment insurance and
potential undocumented persons knew this,-a big "if," given undocumented persons' frequent
lack of knowledge, see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text-eligibility may motivate illegal
entry in a certain cohort of cases.
Risk-averse individuals, i.e., those with a low tolerance for uncertainty, may only be willing
to venture illegal entry if they knew that the availability of unemployment insurance would
cushion them when jobs were scarce in the United States. From this perspective, one's barring
of undocumented workers from receiving unemployment benefits is a meaningful, albeit still
marginal, deterrent to illegal immigration. Compare Ayala v. California Unemployment Ins.
Bd., 54 Cal. App. 3d 676, 126 Cal. Rptr. 210 (2d Dist. 1976) (approving eligibility for disability
benefits conditioned on medical disability, which undocumented person cannot predict and which
therefore could not furnish basis for decisions to enter United States illegally) with Alonso v.
California, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (2d Dist. 1975) (disallowing unemployment
insurance for undocumented workers in part on ground that allowing 'benefits would encourage
illegal immigration).
The fit between sanction and disfavored conduct of employers may be less close than the fit
for undocumented workers in the unemployment insurance realm. Employers benefit when
undocumented workers are ineligible for unemployment insurance, although this benefit to
employers is more attenuated than the benefits which accrue when undocumented workers are
barred from employment law remedies. In the case of unemployment insurance, employers benefit
because the departure of undocumented workers from the payroll will not be added to the
employer's total tax liability under the federal unemployment insurance tax program. The
termination of other employees increases the employer's tax liability. This difference in tax
consequences provides employers with an unintended incentive to hire undocumented workers.
See Arteaga, 735 P.2d at 481.
Nonetheless, the incentive has less of an impact than the incentive yielded by the system's
elimination of employment law remedies. Eliminating employment law remedies directly assists
employers who wish to exploit undocumented labor by making it easier for employers to pay
undocumented employees less, work them more, and fire them if they complain. The system's
barring of undocumented workers from eligibility for unemployment insurance affects the
employer only if the employer terminates an undocumented worker. The advantage to such
employer who hires undocumented labor is purely contingent-it hinges on the undocumented
employee's ultimate termination. Even at the point of the employee's termination, the savings
resulting from the employer's avoidance of tax liability does not equal the savings derived from
the employer's avoidance of a potential back pay obligation when the undocumented worker has
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undocumented workers. One question may linger. Why should one consider
employment law remedies for undocumented workers important, given the
sanctions against employers already built into the IRCA?
The importance of providing employment law remedies for undocumented
workers lies in the incentives these remedies create for private supplementation
of government enforcement efforts. If we reward private individuals with
remedies such as reinstatement and monetary relief, the potential reward
encourages individuals to take unilateral action to secure their respective rights
or to cooperate with governmental authorities. 1°° The results of this private
involvement are better than the results yielded by the government, with its
limited resources, acting alone. The IRCA employer sanctions provisions
contain no mechanism which encourages private cooperation with enforcement
efforts. 01 Making employment law remedies available to undocumented work-
ers would therefore supplement the IRCA scheme.
no access to employment law remedies.
Moreover, unlike a reinstatement remedy, one's eligibility for unemployment insurance does
not trump the employer's ability to discharge workers illegally. The employer remains free to
terminate an employee-he merely experiences a modest increase in tax liability as a result. Thus,
a system which prevents this increase of tax liability by denying eligibility to undocumented
workers does not, by itself, promote wholesale hiring of undocumented workers. Cf. Arteaga,
735 P.2d at 486 (Rovira, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for "stretching far afield" with
"novel" view that unemployment insurance has significant role as deterrent of exploitation in
workplace).
The ineligibility of undocumented workers for unemployment insurance should not substantially
enhance the attractiveness of one's hiring undocumented labor, even assuming that employers
tend to have knowledge of such relatively arcane issues. However, it is impossible to discount
the influence of this factor on the margins. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Accordingly,
to confirm fully the undesirability of unemployment insurance for undocumented workers,
analysis must shift to a secondary goal of immigration policy: minimizing transfers of resources
from taxpayers to the undocumented population. See Alonso, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 253, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 543 (making undocumented workers eligible for unemployment insurance would amount
to "subsidizing" undocumented population). See also infra notes 92-112 and accompanying text
(discussing interaction of employment law remedies and avoidance of taxpayer transfers to
undocumented persons).
100. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
101. There are no provisions in the IRCA which, for example, allow the government to seek
back pay awards against offending employers. Moreover, it is far from clear who would be in
a position to receive a back pay award if indeed back pay was a possible remedy under the
IRCA. Employers who hire undocumented workers hurt domestic workers indirectly by depressing
the general labor market. See D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 4, at 153-55; Fogel, supra
note 3, at 67-68; Wachter, The Labor Market and Illegal Immigration: The Outlook for the
1980's, 33 IN'DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 342, 350-52 (1980). But see Borjas, Immigrants, Minorities,
and Labor Market Competition, 40 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REv. 382 (1987) (increases in supply of
immigrant labor have only slight effects on earnings of native-born men). Attempts to find
specific victims who can prove that they were damaged because a particular employer hired
undocumented workers present distinctively difficult problems of causation. See generally Chavez
v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.) (declining to imply private right of action
under INA for domestic workers allegedly injured by domestic employers' hiring of undocumented
workers on ground, inter alia, that implying such a right would constitute deciding a "political
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Establishing these remedies would help accomplish one of the prime goals
of immigration policy: the reduction of illegal immigration. We may indeed
be able to modify economic forces to affect the before-the-fact calculations
of potential illegal immigrants who are still in their countries of origin.
However, different issues arise in coping after-the-fact with undocumented
persons in the United States. The next subsection discusses how the act of
providing employment law remedies for undocumented workers would affect
these issues.
B. Reducing Transfers of Resources from Taxpayers to Undocumented
Persons
While a primary objective of Congress' immigration policy is to reduce
illegal immigration, a secondary goal also exists: to minimize the transfer of
resources from taxpayers to undocumented workers and their families. This
goal follows from the rationale behind the first objective. It would add insult
to injury if the congressional immigration scheme allowed for the diversion
of taxpayer resources'02 to undocumented workers who arguably place United
States workers at a competitive disadvantage.' 3 Therefore, any theory re-
garding employment law remedies and undocumented workers which provides
for greater governmental subsidies of such persons suffers from fundamental
flaws. The premise of this section is that a remedial scheme which maximizes
undocumented workers' recourse against employers will minimize the burden
on the taxpaying public.
The rationale for this view of complete employment law protections for
undocumented workers lies in the link between taxpayer transfers and private
market transactions, rights, and remedies. The government provides services
of last resort. As one's private options narrow, one must turn to the govern-
question beyond the jurisdiction of the courts .... "), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). These
problems of causation will also discourage courts from implying private rights of action under
the IRCA. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. Cm. L. REV. 800, 820 (1983) (suggesting that courts, whenever possible, avoid creating
judicial role in controversies presenting problems of fact-finding or other issues which consume
substantial judicial resources).
102. Even legal immigration is governed in part by the government's desire to prevent
immigrants from creating a drain on the United States Treasury. The provision in the INA which
excludes from admission to the United States those "likely .. . to become public charges"
illustrates this concern. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1982). Other components of immigration
law seek to promote the same end. See, e.g., Pear, Immigration Rules Require New Proof From
Job Seekers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 1, A16, col. 3 (INS officials quoted as
justifying proposed $100.00 application fee for those seeking legalization of status under IRCA
as consistent with provision excluding those likely to become public charges). Legislation which
has the effect of barring undocumented workers from receiving unemployment insurance benefits
has a similar rationale. Unemployment insurance is financed by contributions from domestic
employers and employees which are placed in a general fund. See supra note 99. A system which
permits undocumented persons to tap into the fund would drain its resources.
103. See supra note 101 (citing sources on impact of undocumented workers in United States
labor market).
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ment for assistance. When private options expand, the government's role
contracts. This contraction reduces taxpayer transfers.
A hypothetical scenario demonstrates the point. Suppose Slimy, Inc., which
provides various health benefits to its employees, refused to provide pregnancy
benefits for its female workers. Slimy is in violation of Title VII. 104 At least
one undocumented worker is a member of the class of female employees
against whom Slimy discriminated.0 5 Let us suppose, however, that the.
undocumented worker is without a remedy under Title VII by virtue of her
undocumented status. Therefore, unlike her colleagues, she has no way of
securing benefits from Slimy. Like her colleagues, however, she needs prenatal
care. As a responsible expectant mother, she knows that this care is important
to the well-being of her baby. But, without benefits from Slimy, she cannot
pay for the care herself. Who will provide the money? If our hypothetical
victim of discrimination is an amnesty candidate, she may be eligible for
Medicaid. °0 If she is a grandfathered or non-grandfathered employee, she
may not be eligible. She then has two options: 1) she can attempt to obtain
care from a municipal or county hospital, which must absorb the full cost
of this care without federal assistance; 10 7 or, 2) she can go without prenatal
care.
In each of the above situations, the taxpayer subsidizes the remediless
victim. If the government provides the care, financing comes from a varying
mixture of federal, state, county, and city dollars. If the government does
not provide prenatal care, the ultimate cost to taxpayers is much greater. A
baby born without adequate prenatal care is far more likely to develop birth
defects. A child suffering from birth defects may require long term care,
special education services, 08 or even institutionalization as he or she develops.
The taxpayers will foot the bill for many of these services. The result is a
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (mandating employer's provision of pregnancy benefits
when employer provides other health disability benefits).
105. A lawsuit challenging denial of pregnancy benefits to an undocumented person, who was
also an amnesty candidate, is pending in federal district court in California. See Bishop, U.S.
Lawsuit May Determine Protections for Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at A17, col.
1.
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(3)(B)(iXII) (Supp. IV 1986). Our hypothetical employee may not
even be eligible for Medicaid as an amnesty candidate since the above-cited provision applies by
its terms only to persons who have actually been granted legalized status. Id. at § 1255a(h)(i).
107. Hospitals which participate in the Medicare program may not withhold emergency care
from any individual. "Denial of eligibility for Medicaid will not-and should not-result in a
denial of needed medical services. Instead it will merely shift the cost of those medical services
from the Federal and State governments to the provider, which in many cases is the local public
hospital or clinic." H.R. REp. No. 682 (IV), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5824. New York City municipal hospitals alone spend at
least $18 million each year on health care for undocumented persons, over half of which are
pregnant women who failed to receive adequate prenatal care. Id.
108. See The Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (mandating provision for a free, appropriate public education, including related services,
for handicapped children).
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transfer of resources from taxpayers to undocumented persons and their
families. 109
The most simple and effective way to reduce such transfers is to afford
the victim of discrimination a range of remedies against her employer. The
victim may then secure benefits from her employer and this, in turn, may
even deter the employer from seeking to deny those benefits for others.110
Governmental transfers of resources are not necessary to pick up the slack
otherwise created by employers maneuvering for competitive advantage. In
this situation, taxpayers do not later become the underwriters of health care,
at greater cost.
The above analysis assumes that the misery employers impose on undoc-
umented workers is itself not an effective deterrent to illegal immigration."'
Indeed, the premise is that, as long as employment is available, harsh results
have little effect on the decisions of prospective undocumented persons to
enter the United States illegally. If one accepts this premise, the prospect of
alleviating some of the harsh results imposed upon undocumented workers
through illegal conduct of employers is no longer troubling. Mitigating harsh
outcomes will not frustrate immigration policy. The only goal left to consider
is minimizing leakage from the public fisc. Giving undocumented workers
employment rights and remedies accomplishes this objective. The institution
of broad employment law rights and remedies would therefore be consistent
with immigration concerns.
The opposing view holds that imposing a standard of living upon undoc-
umented workers which endangers their families' health will encourage them
to leave the United States and return to their country of origin. This hypo-
109. The pregnancy situation is just one example of this phenomenon. Poor people, including
exploited undocumented persons, are more vulnerable to disease. The larger community, which
includes citizens and lawful residents, is vulnerable to the spread of disease. See H.R. REP. No.
682(IV), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs
5817-18 (noting importance of meeting public health and medical needs of undocumented
persons). The state's interest in curbing health problems among exploited workers and their
families was one justification for enactment of minimum wage and maximum hour legislation
near the turn of the century. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (rejecting this
justification as strained, and striking down maximum hours legislation). But the Lochner Court's
disdain for this broad view of states' police power is now almost "universally" in disrepute. See
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDicIAL REVIEW 14-15 (1980). But see R.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 279-80 (1985)
(asserting that minimum wage and maximum hour legislation is, as the Lochner Court asserted,
an unconstitutional abridgment of employers' and employees' rights to contract freely for pay
and services).
Taxpayer transfers are also significant in tort law. When the victim of a tort is not compensated,
or is undercompensated for her loss, the public often ends up paying for her health care and
services. See G. CALAtBREsi, supra note 66, at 147-48.
110. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text (discussing deterrent effect of remedies on
potential wrongdoers). See also Posner, supra note 50 (discussing efficiency of common law
adjudication in tort law). Cf. G. CALABRESi, supra note 66, at 239-87 (discussing weaknesses of
common law adjudication in tort law).
111. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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thetical result clearly promotes immigration policy. However, the result is not
plausible in practice. To translate this hypothesis into reality, a given outcome
in the United States must not only be harsh, but also must be more harsh
than what the undocumented person may reasonably expect in his country
of origin. Only then would the undocumented person have a sufficient reason
to leave the United States. For better or worse, however, the undocumented
person's access to health care, safe and clean accommodations, and education
in the United States will almost invariably exceed his access to such goods
and services elsewhere. 1 2
In these circumstances, harsh outcomes spawned by a lack of employment
rights in the United States will not promote the exodus of undocumented
workers. Such outcomes will only enhance government's role as the provider
of services of last resort. As we increase governmental services, taxpayers
must transfer more resources to the undocumented population.
The above discussion demonstrates that the extension of employment rights
to undocumented workers would promote immigration policy by curbing the
demand for undocumented labor and limiting the transfer of public resources
to undocumented persons. In addition to promoting immigration policy, the
expansive approach to undocumented workers' rights and remedies under
federal employment law also serves institutional values. The next subsection
discusses this issue.
C. Institutional Concerns
A significant virtue of the broad approach to remedies which this Article
recommends is the minimal strain it would impose upon courts' and agencies'
legitimacy and resources. It is of course true that the institutional advantages
which the broad approach yields may not, by themselves, be dispositive on
the issue. Nonetheless, these advantages do provide further support for the
adoption of the expansive approach.
This Article will initially consider the issue of legitimacy. Is it legitimate
for a court or agency to conclude that remedies, which are otherwise pre-
sumptively available under federal employment law, are unavailable to un-
documented workers because of the underlying policies of immigration law?
If Congress had set out, either in the text of the IRCA or in amendments to
labor and employment laws, the remedial regime which courts and agencies
should apply to undocumented workers, the issue would not arise. ' 3 However,
112. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (barring states from excluding undocumented
alien children from public education).
113. Courts and agencies would simply follow congressional instructions. Given the absence
of constitutional concerns, all congressional commands would be dispositive. Congress could
exclude undocumented workers from coverage under labor laws altogether. It could also restrict
the availability of prohibitory injunctions, monetary relief, and reinstatement. In the alternative,
Congress could embrace the full spectrum remedial model. If Congress provided explicit directives
in the text of legislation it would minimize uncertainty. Unfortunately, Congress is coy. See infra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing institutional shortcomings of Congress).
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the problem for courts and agencies confronting this issue is congressional
silence."4
Congress created institutional problems for courts and agencies when it
enacted the current cadre of employment-related legislation. In establishing
the reach of federal employment statutes, Congress used very general terms
such as "employee"'15 and "individual."" 6 Accordingly, courts would seem
to be on firm ground by interpreting such terms broadly in order to encompass
a wide range of situations." 7 However, uncertainties arise if the facts which
a court faces in a particular case were apparently not contemplated by
Congress when it drafted the general language. In such instances, courts and
agencies have experienced the temptation to read exceptions into such statutes
in an attempt to cope with the unforeseen situation."'
114. The Supreme Court has observed: "[t]he search for significance in the silence of Congress
is too often the pursuit of a mirage." Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942). For a discussion of treatments of congressional silence, see
Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitu-
tional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
115. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982); FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1982).
116. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
117. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (lth Cir. 1988) (construing
term "employee" in FLSA to include undocumented workers).
118. Courts do not always bow to this temptation. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 37
U.S. 153 (1978) (snail darter case rejecting view that Endangered Species Act (currently codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982), which required federal agencies to "insure" that public works
projects and other activities did not "jeopardize the continued existence" of endangered species,
did not apply to projects in progress at time of Act's enactment). But cf. Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (construing broad language in law barring immi-
gration to permit exception for Judeo-Christian clerics); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E.
188 (1889) (reading New York wills statute which established rule that property should duly pass
from testator to heir as containing implicit exception in case where heir murdered testator).
Judicial fashioning of such exceptions has.prompted wide and persistent debate in the scholarly
literature.
For scholarly discussions of the Tennessee Valley Auth. decision, compare R. DWORKIN, LAW's
EMIREpu 313-54 (1986) [hereinafter R.' DwoRKiN, LAW's EMPIRE] (criticizing majority); Moore,
The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 281 (1981) (characterizing decision as "absurd
and unjust"); with Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions,
45 U. PIr. L. REy. 513, 515-19 (1984) (approving of result on ground that Court was not
equipped to choose between building dams and destroying species); Plater, Statutory Violations
and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524, 586-92 (1982) (same); Schoenbrod, The Measure
of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedies, 72
MINN. L. Rv. 627, 648-49 (1988) (describing result as consistent with congressional purpose).
A seminal commentator attacked Riggs as resting on an unconvincing, fictional model of
legislative purpose. See Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 379, 382 (1907).
Modern commentators, however, have found the decision much more palatable. See R. DwouxiN,
LAW'S EMPIRE, supra, at 15-20 (invoking principle that no person should profit from her own
wrong); R. DWORKIN,. TAKINo. RIGHTS SERousLY 37 (1977) (same); H.M. HART & A. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PRocEss: BAsIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 97-102 (1958)
(discussing negative implications of Dean Pound's arguments); Moore, supra, at 277-78; Wel-
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication,
83 YALE L.J. 221, 222-23 (1973) (discussing analogous case construing life insurance policy when
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Courts and agencies that read exceptions into broad statutory language
pose a problem in that such institutions are not as accountable to the electorate
as is Congress. 1 9 The courts and agencies that carve out exceptions to broad
statutory language thus risk making decisions reserved for the electorate's
direct representatives. This judicial intrusion into legislative territory exposes
courts and agencies to attacks on their legitimacy. 21
The threat to legitimacy is greatest when the temptation to read exceptions
into broad language occurs in areas such as immigration, where the force of
symbolism' 2' is strong . 2 2 The influence of symbolism enhances the risk that
beneficiary murders insured). See also Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L.
Rav. 1083, 1121 (1988) (recommending that freer interpretive style of Riggs be adopted in area
of professional responsibility in order to give lawyers more leeway in ethical decisions).
One modern commentator has set forth an approach to dealing with statutes which is predicated
on the notion that courts should freely and openly modify statutes when changing circumstances
render them obsolete. See G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
For some of the critiques of Calabresi's proposal, see Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido
Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y:U. L. REV. 1126 (1982);
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 213 (1983). For discussion of Calabresi's method as it could be applied to a particular
social problem, see Margulies, The Newest Equal Protection: City of Cleburne and a Common
Law for Statutes and Covenants Affecting Group Homes for the Mentally Disabled, 3 N.Y.L.
SCM. HuM. RTS. ANN. 359 (1986) (discussing interpretation of statutes to promote housing for
the mentally disabled). A more moderate approach to the updating of statutes is outlined in
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (recommending
that broad terms in statutes be interpreted to reflect changing political, social and economic
realities).
119. The political accountability of bureaucrats, who at policy making levels come andl go
with different administrations, may help palliate their use of unstructured decision-making. See
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions?, 1 J.L. EcON.
& ORG. 81 (1985). But cf. T. Lows, THE END OF LmAnsM 92-124, 298-305 (1969) (discussing
lack of clear, consistent policy making in administrative agencies); Schoenbrod, The Delegation
Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985) (urging courts to
constrain Congress' propensity for ceding uncharted discretion to agencies). However, federal
courts, protected from political influence and accountability by life tenure, rely on amenability
to judicial review as the sole check on administrative authority. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984).
120. See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv.
593, 611 (1958) (deriding Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as a naked attempt to give
effect to conservative type policies).
121. See infra notes 199-215 and accompanying text.
122. See generally R. NIsBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45-59 (1980) (discussing why vivid, emotionally charged stimuli cloud
evaluation of more abstract, empirically sound information such as statistical studies). Courts
have often resisted the lure of symbolism when dealing with issues of undocumented workers'
access to employment protections and entitlements. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down Civil Service Commission rule barring aliens from most positions
in federal civil service); Lewis v. Grinker, 660 F. Supp. 169, 171-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (court
declined to give retroactive effect to statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (Supp. IV 1986),
limiting undocumented persons' access to Medicaid benefits to situations requiring emergency
medical care); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1180-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
undocumented persons were entitled to Medicaid benefits absent express statutory provision to
the contrary).
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exceptions to broad statutory terms such as "employee" or "individual" will
flow from the particular biases of decisionmakers. 121 Institutional legitimacy
requires instead that judicially created exceptions to statutory terms derive
from the policies underlying the legislation. 12
This caveat is important when the need to consider exceptions to the broad
language of one statute derives from the force of another statute. A court
may consider, for example, whether a fugitive from the law is entitled to
federal employment law protections. Must employers pay the minimum wage
to Jake Shotwell, an accused multiple murderer on the run? This particular
example may be frivolous, of course, because fugitives responsible for murder
rarely seek the intervention of government agencies. Other groups, however,
share this shyness syndrome, including undocumented persons.
Both the fugitive murderer, Jake, who comes within the ambit of the
criminal law, and the undocumented person, who is within the ambit of the
immigration law, create in some the urge to write exceptions into the general
language of employment legislation. No one wants to reward or encourage a
fugitive from justice, just as no one wants to reward an undocumented
person. In each case, a statutory exception seems intuitively plausible, even
compelling. In each case, however, one is faced with two troubling questions:
1) does a conflict exist between employment legislation and another statutory
scheme?; and, 2) if a conflict does exist, how must the decision-maker resolve
it?
Courts and agencies must face the first question. Under a system which
grants the legislature the last word on statutory interpretation,'25 courts and
agencies cannot ignore the possibility that judicial or administrative decisions
123. The pragmatists and legal realists long ago unveiled the role of bias in decision-making.
See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); 0. W. HOLMES, Ti COMMON LAW
1 (1881) (citing the "prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men"); W. JAMES, supra
note 48, at 19-23 (discussing covert role of "temperament" in making ostensibly principled
choices); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L.
REV. 1222 (1931); Posner, Book Review, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 870 (1985) (discussing Holmes'
contribution). See generally Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827
(1988) [hereinafter Posner, Skepticism] (discussing role of social, political and economic views
in judicial decision-making). More recently, critical legal scholars have raised this point. See, e.g.,
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518 (1986); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAv. L.
REv. 1685 (1976); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1 (1984). Justice Stevens has been more candid than most judges about the effect of social or
political bias on adjudication. While dissenting from the Court's recent decision which narrows
the scope of the federal mail fraud statute, he raised questions about "why a Court that has
not been particularly receptive to the rights of criminal defendants in recent years acted so
dramatically to protect the elite class of powerful individuals who will benefit from this decision."
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. See Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549,
555 (1985) ("[wlhatever its own policy view may be, the Court's job is to discover and effectuate
the legislative will as expressed in the text of the enacted statute.").
125. See Diver, supra note 124, at 555.
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aimed at implementing one statute, such as the NLRA, will frustrate the
objectives of another statute, such as the IRCA.126 If these decisionmaking
bodies ignore this potential conflict, they may also disregard the very purpose
of the legislature which enacted the statute. Courts and agencies have no such
authority.
Courts and agencies also have a distinct institutional advantage over Con-
gress in coping with statutory conflicts. Courts and agencies deal with enact-
ments on a practical level, through lawsuits, complaints, and rulemaking.
127
Conflicts surface at the practical level, during the implementation of legislation
rather than before its enactment.
This practical perspective on legislation is less accessible to Congress.
Congress considers statutes at the drafting and investigative stages, when
implementation is merely the product of hypothesis and conjecture. After
Congress enacts a statute, it typically moves on to other problems. The crush
of issues and interests is so heavy in the legislative branch that implementation
questions, such as coordination with existing statutes, receive only cursory
review. 12 8 If we force Congress to focus on anomalies among different statutes,
it must painstakingly develop the voting majority necessary for legislative
action. That is a cumbersome and thankless task.'29 It is therefore generally
more sensible and more realistic for courts and agencies to confront such
anomalies and seek their resolution. The employment and labor realm is no
different than any other in this respect.
However, conflicts among statutes do not always exist. Finding a conflict
in every legal problem would require a court or agency to constantly choose
among competing statutes. In the labor/immigration area, the need to choose
might even result in the judicial or administrative "repeal" of employment
law rights for one portion of society. Our constitutional concern for main-
taining the separation of powers, however, dictates that courts and agencies
126. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984) (citing Southern S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)); Note, Retaliatory Reporting, supra note 15, at 1302-06.
127. See Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881,
934 (1986).
128. See Margulies, After Marek the Deluge. Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 of
Statutes Which Do and Don't Classify Attorney's Fees as "Costs," 73 IOWA L. REv. 413, 424-
25 & n.76 (1988) (discussing Congress' lack of interest in coordinating definition of attorney's
fees in scores of statutes providing for fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs); Mikva, Reading and
Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEx. L. Rv. 181, 184 (1986) ("[m]embers of Congress do not even
closely follow cases directly involving or interpreting statutes that they have sponsored or in
which they have an interest.").
129. See Mikva, supra note 128, at 187 ("it is not easy to get 535 prima donnas to agree on
anything"). See also supra note 23 (citing materials discussing compromise and legislative process).
See generally D. MUELLER, supra note 55 (discussing difficulties inherent in any form of collective
decision-making).
The problems of group decision-making plague courts as well as legislatures. See Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982); Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking
the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986).
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should normally leave to Congress the job of repealing a statute.13 0
Nonetheless, in many instances, courts and agencies can interpret statutes
to eliminate or reduce contradictions. This harmonizing function protects the
legitimacy of courts and agencies. When courts and agencies harmonize
statutes, each enactment ends up having the maximum possible force and
effect. Such action also stifles a court's or an agency's urge to nullify
legislation because of personal biases.' 3'
130. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 523-24 (1987); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Posadas v. National
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (1 lth Cir. 1988).
For some examples of commentary on specific areas of conflict between statutes, see Haggard,
The Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin Strikes: Resolving the Apparent Conflict Between
the Bankruptcy Code and the Anti-Injunction Provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 703 (1985); Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law,
49 U. Cm. L. REv. 394 (1982). For examples of decisions finding an implied repeal of one
statute because of perceived conflict with a subsequent enactment, see Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992 (1984) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) would not supply cause of action in
situation covered by Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982)) (overruled
by Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (Supp. IV 1986));
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that § 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act (currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)) repealed
bar on injunctions to enforce provisions of labor contracts established by Norris-LaGuardia Act
(currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982))).
131. The threat of personal biases of a decision-maker exerting undue influence is a real
concern when a court or agency must decide which of two statutes to derogate, just as such bias
plays a role whenever a court or agency considers making exceptions to broad statutory language.
See Haggard, supra note 130, at 704 ("a court's real reasons for favoring a statute [over another],
rarely admitted but usually obvious, often consist of nothing more than a judicial preference for
the policy of one statute over that of another").
The area of a court finding exceptions to statutes is not the only fertile ground for the
influence of a court's bias in statutory interpretation. A comparable danger can be reading too
much into a statute. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down as
beyond administrative authority regulations promulgated by federal Civil Service Commission
excluding all aliens, regardless of legal status, from most federal jobs). See also Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (NLRA does not authorize NLRB to require employers who
are found to have discharged employees in a discriminatory manner to reimburse governmental
agencies that subsequently hired discharged workers). The compound peril here is that determining
how much is too much for statutory authority to support is also a matter shaped by personal
predilection. See Schoenbrod, supra note 119, at 1236-37 (noting that some of the Justices tend
to find excessive delegation when human rights such as expression and employment are involved,
while others see improper delegation in cases concerning economic and environmental regulation).
Whenever a court decides that an exception to, or expansion of, a statute is beyond judicial
and administrative authority, there is always a chance that Congress will enact legislation
permitting or mandating the rejected construction. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (1982)
(setting up committee of executive officials to consider exemptions from requirements of Endan-
gered Species Act); Pub. L. No. 96-69, tit. IV, 93 Stat. 437, 449 (1979) (directing completion of
Tellico Dam despite danger to snail darter and thus overruling Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978)); Exec. Order No. 11, 935, 5 C.F.R. 13 (1983), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
3301 app. at 384 (1976) (barring aliens from federal civil service and overruling Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (Supp. 1988) (barring Medicaid
reimbursement for all but emergency medical care for undocumented persons and overruling
1989] UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 595
The apparent conflict between immigration and employment law is suscep-
tible to such harmonization. The main sources of conflict dissolve if one
focuses on the policies underlying the legislation rather than the lure of
symbolism. If courts would simply focus on these policies it would become
clear that affording employment law protections to fugitives and undocu-
mented workers does not clash with criminal or immigration law norms.1
2
In fact, if we deprive undocumented workers and fugitives of such protections,
Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)). Professor Schuck has criticized the Court's
decision in Hampton on the ground that the Court should have viewed the President's and
Congress' inaction in the face of the Civil Service Commission's regulation as an overwhelming
indication that the regulation enjoyed presidential and congressional approval. Under this view,
judicial insistence on an executive order which bars aliens from the federal civil service represents
a needless attachment to legal formalities. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 65 & n.361; Schuck,
Organization Theory and the Teaching of Administrative Law, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 13, 17 (1983).
On formality in the separation of powers generally, see Bruff, Legislative Formality, Adminis-
trative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1984); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLuM. L. REv. 573 (1984). One can turn
around Schuck's argument, however. The counterargument is that subsequent action by a more
accountable branch of government, be it Congress or the President, demonstrates that the Court
was, because of its lack of accountability, at an institutional disadvantage. Insistence on formality
copes with this institutional disadvantage by remanding such a decision to a more accountable
branch of government. See Farber, supra note 118, at 517-19 (discussing Tennessee Valley Auth.
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
This institutional analysis supports the availability of employment law remedies for undocu-
mented workers. Even if Congress may be more likely to disallow such remedies, it should
nevertheless state clearly that it wishes to alter the broad language of employment statutes, given
its history of excluding both documented and undocumented aliens from entitlements and social
goods such as employment. See Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political
Process: A Comment on Sinclar v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963) (urging that courts
remain cautious in reading exceptions into the Norris-LaGuardia Act). See also Schuck, supra
note 2, at 84 (approving "clear statement" approaches to statutory interpretations which affect
"life and liberty interests"). The need for clear statements by Congress supporting exceptions to
employment statutes is especially compelling because the IRCA's text and legislative history
manifest a discernible if not resounding preference against reading undocumented workers out
of federal employment law. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. These legislative
materials do not, however, resolve issues regarding available remedies for undocumented workers
under law existing prior to enactment of the IRCA. Id. An institutional as well as policy rationale
for why courts or agencies should not read exceptions into employment statutes is therefore
vital.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33 (discussing hypothetical fugitive-from-justice
situation). The fugitive-from-justice situation is offered merely as an illustration of the frequent
divergence of intuitive responses-e.g., we should never "reward" fugitives-and measures which
further sound policies-e.g., rewarding fugitives when the only other choice is rewarding em-
ployers who knowingly harbor fugitives.
The reasoning adopted here would not necessarily support adoption of the entire approach of
this Article to fugitives' employment rights. The analysis of confidentiality, for example, would
have to be different. Fugitives may commit other criminal acts. Undocumented persons are much
less likely to engage in criminal behavior. Public safety concerns would dictate making every
effort to apprehend fugitives before they commit additional crimes. The government's promise
of confidentiality would be difficult to justify in light of this mandate.
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we impede rather than promote the ends of immigration policy and criminal
law. Employers will have an incentive to hire these groups if they are not
protected by employment laws. The availability of employment will spur
immigration and subsidize the fugitive's flight. If we include such persons in
the class protected by such laws, we reduce these phenomena. In contrast, if
decisionmakers completely eliminate undocumented workers from the pro-
tected class or limit their remedies to cease and desist orders, those decision-
makers frustrate employment law goals.' 3  Further, the resulting benefits under
this scenario for immigration policy are, at best, speculative and symbolic. 3 4
If we wish to vindicate both employment law and immigration law concerns,
we must maintain employment law rights and remedies for undocumented
workers. 3 ' Institutional legitimacy is most compatible with this approach.
Legitimacy, however, is not the only factor which affects the soundness of
institutions. The conservation of institutional resources is also important.
Thus, an approach which minimizes the cost of decisions is, all other things
being equal, superior to an approach which contemplates the profligate
expenditure of time and resources.3 6 The broad approach to rights and
remedies advanced in this Article passes that test.
Court and agency determinations of immigration status tax the decision-
making capacity of such institutions which were not established for that
purpose. Furthermore, such determinations require the decision-maker to
exercise a degree of discretion because consideration of certain equitable
factors, such as the presence of undocumented persons' children, will some-
times result in stays of deportation.'17 The administrative weighing of these
equitable elements is admittedly feasible; the INS does it on a regular basis.
Courts and other agencies, however, lack the requisite training. They will
spend an inordinate amount of time balancing immigration equities, which
will likely result in their making mistakes. Further, correcting such mistakes
will require even more time.
133. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 68-101 and accompanying text; infra notes 199-215 and accompanying
text.
135. Certain situations call for the government's curtailing of employment law remedies as a
price for avoiding conflict with immigration policy. See infra notes 149-74 and accompanying
text. These situations are exceptions to the presumed availability of comprehensive relief for
undocumented victims of employment law violations.
136. See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 66-69 (1983);
Posner, supra note 101, at 820. On decision costs generally, see D. MUELLER, supra note 55, at
19-67 (describing costs inherent in various voting procedures); Calabresi & Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAav. L. Rav. 1089,
1106-10 (1972) (describing costs of reaching collective decision to buy and sell property which
consists of many individually owned parcels).
137. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982) (permitting petitions to suspend deportation). See also Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (discussing operation of statutory and regulatory framework);
Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same).
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Such efforts may also result in duplicative factfinding. One cannot be sure
that the unskilled court or agency's assessment of immigration status will
spare the INS from treading over the same ground. The INS proceedings
provide procedural safeguards which a court or other agency cannot extend
to plaintiffs and complainants in employment matters without incurring
substantial decision costs.' If a court or an agency fails to provide these
procedural safeguards, its immigration decision will not have a binding effect
for immigration purposes.'3 9 The INS will have to expend its own resources
in making a second determination of immigration status. This scenario wastes
time, paper, and expertise. It also restricts access for complainants whose
claims do not have an immigration dimension.
The broad approach to employment law rights and remedies advanced in
this Article dispenses with most of these problems. In most cases, a court or
agency may simply decline to hear, let alone evaluate, any evidence on
complainants' immigration status. This outcome will conserve court and
agency resources, and leave investigation of immigration matters to the INS,
which was created for that purpose.
IV. ENFORCING EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
As Part III of this Article has demonstrated, three underlying goals should
govern enforcement of employment rights for undocumented workers: 1)
deterring illegal immigration; 2) avoiding taxpayer transfers to the undocu-
mented population; and, 3) conserving institutional resources and legitimacy.
Taken together, these three goals support an approach that would encourage
undocumented workers to file administrative complaints and institute court
actions in all cases where their employers have violated employment law.
Two features are vital to this agenda. First, the range of remedies available
should be comprehensive, including prohibitory injunctions which require
employers to cease and desist from committing future violations, back pay
awards, supercompensatory monetary relief, 14° and to grant reinstatement.
Second, all complaints and subsequent proceedings must be subject to a high
138. Local 512, 795 F.2d at 722.
139. Id. (asserting that NLRB decision on immigration status reached without adequate
procedural safeguards, including application of "clear ... and convincing evidence" standard
of proof, would be vulnerable to due process attack).
140. Supercompensatory relief would include the double damages provisions of the FLSA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
Another type of approach, brought to my attention by Ron Silverman, involves offering
substantial bounties of $10,000 or more to anyone who conveyed information about exploitative
employers to enforcement agencies such as the NLRB. Since such a bounty would exceed the
size of most back pay awards, it would offer greater incentive to undocumented workers to
come forward. Cf. supra notes 47, 59 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of strictly
compensatory measure of relief as incentive for revealing information about violations). The
disadvantage of the bounty proposal is that the public might view it as a windfall for undocu-
mented workers. Cf. supra notes 183-216 and accompanying text (discussing symbolism behind
public suspicion of undocumented persons).
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degree of confidentiality. An approach that embraces these features will
promote immigration policy. In certain individual cases, however, such fea-
tures will operate to reward individual illegal immigrants and shield them
from deportation. But such counterintuitive results for undocumented workers
already in the United States are tolerable, indeed necessary, to effectively
discourage employment of other undocumented workers and thereby reduce
incentives for future illegal immigration. Thus, one should not consider the
counterintuitive character of this approach as a bar to the regime's deploy-
ment. One should limit the scope of the regime proposed here only in
situations which present a clear conflict with immigration law or policy.
A. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is a prerequisite for any enforcement efforts which involve
the cooperation of undocumented workers. Confidentiality is crucial when
one seeks the cooperation of parties who fear disclosure of their status,
identity, and location. This fear permeates underground populations such as
undocumented workers in the United States.' 4' Without confidentiality, the
INS could treat undocumented complainants as persons informing on them-
selves for immigration purposes. The risk of apprehension by the INS would
negate the appeal for undocumented workers of even the most enticing
package of remedies for their employers' violation of employment law.
However, reducing the risk run by complainants, i.e., ensuring to the extent
possible that complainants will not be in a worse position because of their
cooperation, will enhance enforcement efforts.
While confidentiality facilitates enforcement of employment rights and
therefore helps promote immigration policy, it is clothed with the counter-
intuitive quality which colors this Article's approach. A hypothetical situation
illustrates the anomaly. Suppose an employer discharged an undocumented
worker for complaining to the NLRB about the employer's FLSA violations.
After a hearing, the NLRB ordered the employer to reinstate the employee.
Let us suppose further that the employee is a grandfathered employee under
the IRCA. The employee, therefore, is not covered by the employer sanctions
provisions of the IRCA, but he is still eminently deportable. If the NLRB
discloses the complainant's identity and status, it would allow the INS to
apprehend an illegal immigrant and arrange for his departure from the
141. One judge has endorsed the notion of a protective order barring disclosure of immigration-
related information about complainants. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Jones, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2901 (1988). See also Local 512, 795 F.2d at 710
(Administrative Law Judge in NLRB proceeding "permitted [complainants] to testify under
assumed names .... "). Others have agreed that confidentiality is vital in this area. See, e.g.,
Comment, Remedies for Undocumented Workers, supra note 16, at 592 ("immigration status
[of victims of retaliatory discharges] should not come to the notice of the INS"). The justification
for confidentiality here-promoting the flow of information which would otherwise not be
disseminated-is much the same as the justification for confidentiality regarding the identity of
any valuable informant.
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country. Confidentiality mechanisms in this instance frustrate that core ac-
tivity of United States immigration policy and practice. Does confidentiality,
therefore, command too high a price?
The answer is "no." Confidentiality is worth the price, given our premises.
This is true even though an after-the-fact perspective describes confidentiality
as a nettlesome obstacle to immigration enforcement. Why not take advantage
of an opportunity to rid ourselves of someone who clearly entered the United
States illegally? The answer to this query lies in comparing before-the-fact
and after-the-fact perspectives. 142
Before and after-the-fact perspectives produce radically different views on
the importance of confidentiality. Viewed after-the-fact, the INS's apprehen-
sion of an undocumented worker following a breach of confidentiality would
seem to produce the best of both worlds: information about exploitative
employers and departure of illegal immigrants. A before-the-fact perspective
demonstrates, however, that this optimal result is inherently short-lived. Other
exploited undocumented workers will quickly learn of such tactics, which will
only confirm their fears about the perils of coming forward. Virtually no
undocumented workers will follow the first hapless complainant . 43 Employers
would learn of this reluctance of undocumented workers to complain and
would thereby consider them as an even more attractive source of captive
labor. This result impairs immigration policy.
Thus, while confidentiality for undocumented workers may seem counter-
intuitive, one should not be deceived by appearances. Confidentiality actually
promotes immigration law objectives by curbing employer demand for un-
documented labor.
B. A Range of Remedies
Courts and agencies should have the discretion to provide remedies for
undocumented workers which, like the confidentiality guarantees, will en-
142. The distinction between before-the-fact and after-the-fact vantage points is also described,
for devotees of Latin, as the difference between ex ante and ex post perspectives. For further
discussion of how the selection of one or the other perspective, or the mixture of both viewpoints,
influences decision-making, see Easterbrook, supra note 56, at 10-12 (asserting that ex ante, or
before-the-fact, perspective is superior tool for policy formulation); Fletcher, supra note 76, at
1284-92 (analyzing how combining both perspectives creates anomalies).
143. A useful analogy is the rationale for copyright and patent law. After the fact, it seems
a pity to restrict one's access to a fine novel or a handy new invention. From this perspective,
the benefits of, for instance, a new widget-making process are most widely distributed if copyright
and patent systems do not exist.
However, a before-the-fact perspective tells another story. An invention requires one to expend
time, effort, money and creativity. Incentives for such commitments of resources would vanish
if those who committed resources had no right to prevent others' uncompensated use of the
invention. The availability of patents to inventors provides such incentives for innovation. See
Easterbrook, supra note 56, at 21-29. Similarly, an undocumented worker who takes the time
to complain about exploitative compensation and working conditions will not encourage others
to emulate his actions if that worker cannot protect his identity and status from discovery by
the INS because of his complaint.
1989]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
courage cooperation with enforcement efforts. A comprehensive range of
remedies will elicit more participation from victims than a narrow view of
permissible relief. The following chart depicts the remedial regime which this
Article suggests, broken down according to each of the three subgroups of
undocumented persons: grandfathered workers, non-grandfathered workers
and amnesty candidates.
GRANDFATHERED
WORKERS
NON-
GRANDFATHERED
WORKERS
AMNESTY
CANDIDATES
Cease and Desist X X X
Orders
X X X
Back pay and Other (Modified for persons (modified for persons cur-
Monetary Relief currently outside the rently outside the United
United States)'" States and workers who have
submitted fraudulent docu-
mentation of lawful resi-
dence to employers)'"
Reinstatement X X X
(Unavailable for (Unavailable for persons
persons outside the outside the United States;
United States)'' also unavailable for non-
grandfathered workers who
submitted fraudulent docu-
mentation of lawful resi-
dence to employers)' '7
In this chart, "X"s signify available remedies. Each remedy which the
Article lists in the chart-cease and desist orders, back pay and other monetary
relief, and reinstatement-should be potentially available to each group of
undocumented workers. This Article proposes that this wide availability of
remedies would enhance victim cooperation, deter employers from employ-
ment law violations and, ultimately, reduce employer demand for undocu-
mented labor. Broad access to remedies against employers should also minimize
the transfer of resources to the undocumented population and preserve courts'
and agencies' resources and institutional legitimacy. 48 Even if these broad
principles are accepted, however, one may question whether any exceptions
144. The calculation of a back pay award when an undocumented worker has physically
departed from the United States is discussed infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
145. Reinstatement should not be available to an undocumented worker who has physically
left the United States. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 149-74 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. Institutional values such as the preservation of resources and legitimacy are discussed
supra notes 113-39 and accompanying text.
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to the proposed general regime of broadly available remedies are appropriate.
The following subsection discusses this issue.
C. Application of the Model in Exceptional Situations
While the comprehensive approach to remedies for undocumented workers
derives from a refusal to allow undocumented workers to be denied relief
available to other groups, the approach cannot operate without exceptions.
There are primarily two situations in which an exception should be applied.
In the first situation, the undocumented person is no longer physically present
in the United States. In the second situation, an employer commits an
employment law violation, but complies with the IRCA's mandate that he
request and inspect each employee's documentation of proof of lawful resi-
dence. The following subsections analyze the availability of monetary relief
and reinstatement in each situation.
1. The Undocumented Person's Physical Absence from the United States
Determining how to treat an undocumented person physically absent from
the United States creates problems under the comprehensive model of em-
ployment law remedies advanced in this Article. Undocumented workers are
constantly at some risk of being apprehended and forced to leave the country
by the INS either because their employer has informed on them or because
they have otherwise come to the attention of the INS. It is difficult to predict
at what point apprehension would have occurred without employer interven-
tion. Therefore, the application of monetary relief in this situation presents
problems. Reinstatement also presents problems by encouraging undesirable
behavior. The problems are soluble with regard to monetary relief. Reinstate-
ment, however, poses insurmountable difficulties.
The question of monetary relief is challenging because it contains an element
of speculation in this context. When a worker is not physically available for
work, determining how long she might have been available is subject to
uncertainty. The court and agency nevertheless must calculate the likely
duration of her availability for work if it is to award monetary relief.
One solution to this dilemma is to decline to award monetary relief for
any period during which the victim was not physically present in the United
States and was therefore unavailable for work. The Supreme Court may have
opted for this solution . 49 The problem with this approach is that in instances
where the employer's illegal act consisted of informing the INS of the
undocumented status of a vocal or pro-union employee, a court's bar of a
back pay award permits the employer to profit from his misdeed. Deterrence
requires a remedy which imposes some type of cost on the employer. 1 °
The court or agency may easily compute back pay under traditional meth-
ods. The following hypothetical situation demonstrates the simplicity of the
149. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 901-02 n.ll (1984).
150. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
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calculation. Suppose an undocumented worker earned $10,000 in his United
States job. His employer, our stand-by Slimy, Inc., informed the INS of his
location, and the employee returned voluntarily to, say, Mexico. In Mexico,
the employee, after heroic efforts, secured a job at an annual salary of $2,000.
If one assumes that the employee found this new job immediately, and
arranged for his colleagues in the United States to complain to the NLRB
about Slimy's unfair labor practice, then the employee's measure of relief
for one year is $10,000 minus $2,000 or $8,000. This represents the difference
between what employee X could have made in the United States-$10,000-
and the fruits of his mitigating damages by obtaining another job in Mexico-
$2,000. The result is quite straightforward.
The problem in this analysis is the uncertainty inherent in one's estimate
of the amount of time which employee X could have remained in the United
States undetected by the INS, if his employer, Slimy, had not committed an
unfair labor practice by informing on him. The hypothetical situation set out
above assumes a period of one year. In NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc.,'51 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opined that six months might be the
minimum period necessary to vindicate the remedial purposes of the NLRA.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that this assessment was "conjectural."' '5 2
The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Court of Appeals.'
Conjecture infiltrates the Seventh Circuit's and the hypothetical situation's
assessment because neither considers that the INS could, independent of the
employer's unfair labor practice, have apprehended the employee before the
time which the accounts specify. Suppose that two months after the employer's
unfair labor practice the INS made a routine check at the employer's work-
place. The employee would, in any case, have been deported at this time.
Yet, under the facts given, this departure would have had nothing to do with
the employer's illegal conduct. The court's grant to the employee of a six-
month or one-year award of back pay under these circumstances would result
in an injustice to the employer 54 and a windfall to the employee. Such an
award would effectively render the employer a kind of insurer of his em-
ployee's immigration status. This consequence is clearly inconsistent with the
goals of the IRCA. Accordingly, any approach that attempts to compute
back pay for persons who are outside of the United States must carefully
avoid such thickets.
151. 672 F.2d 592, 606 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
152. 672 F.2d at 606.
153. The Court noted that the district court had failed to seek evidence on this admittedly
vexing issue. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 902 n. 11. One may narrow the Court's holding to facts
revealing lack of physical presence. Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB,
795 F.2d 705, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court's discussion of legal presence as a criterion for
the award of back pay becomes dicta under this analysis.
154. The Supreme Court has held that the NLRA bars awards which are oppressive or
punitive. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). See also Note, Retaliatory Reporting, supra note 15, at 1313 & n.94,
1314 n.107 (discussing cases).
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Some element of conjecture is, however, inevitable in this type of assess-
ment. Back pay determinations based upon the loss of a job opportunity
seek to measure the opportunities for gainful employment which an undo-
cumented worker lost because his employer engineered his deportation. The
measurement of opportunity costs often requires a contingent prediction of
future events. In this process, the predictor seeks to formulate an alternative
future which would have occurred if the events which prevented the person
from realizing that opportunity had not taken place. Any prediction of the
future is perilous.' 5 Back pay determinations are no exception. 15 6
The undocumented worker context presents problems which are particularly
difficult, but which are ultimately amenable to resolution. The context ad-
mittedly involves somewhat more speculation than the norm15 7 because it
encompasses not only the actions of employer and employee, but also the
course of conduct of the INS. However, even actions by this third party are
traceable.
For example, it is possible to reduce uncertainty by inquiring into INS
raids on the defendant employer that occurred after the unlawful discharge
of the complainant. It is reasonable to assume that the INS would have
apprehended the complainant during a subsequent raid if he had not been
discharged unlawfully before the raid occurred. The court could then use the
date of the INS raid as an outer boundary for a back pay award. Suppose
that the wages of the employee here and in his country of origin are those
of our previous hypothetical situation: $10,000 and $2,000 per year, respec-
tively. If an INS raid occurred three months after the employee's unlawful
discharge, a rough back pay computation would be: 3/12 ($10,000 - $2,000)
= $2,000.158
155. See Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad": Procedures for the
Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L.
REV. 793, 823 n.183 (1984) (discussing difficulty of predicting individual's dangerous behavior).
But cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding provision of Bail Reform Act,
which authorizes preventive detention of criminal defendant upon showing that defendant presents
danger to society). For a critical discussion of Salerno, see Note, United States v. Salerno: The
Bail Reform Act Is Here to Stay, 38 DEPAuL L. REv. 165, 184-99 (1988).
156. At a minimum, a back pay award for a given period implies or assumes that a wrongfully
discharged employee would not have been discharged for good cause during the period which
the award covers.
157. See Note, Retaliatory Reporting, supra note 15, at 1313-14 n.97 (sketching approach to
assessment of "future pay," and noting speculative character of assessment).
158. The court should require the employer to produce evidence on this issue because he is
in the best position to gather data on INS action regarding his plant. One may verify the
employer's information with the INS because the employer may have some incentive to claim
that a raid took place earlier rather than later in order to minimize the amount he would pay
out to the complainant. Contact with the INS may not violate any confidentiality guarantee
since the complainant has left the country and the INS therefore no longer has jurisdiction over
him. A court or agency may, however, be concerned about other employees with complaints
pending against the same employer, whose claims would be compromised by INS intervention.
In this event, the court or agency could also seek information on INS raids from other employees.
Employees do not have an interest in establishing an early date-or any date-for INS action.
Their testimony may therefore be most reliable.
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This approach to measuring back pay for employees who are no longer in
the United States because of their employer's unfair labor practices is ad-
mittedly imperfect. All back pay determinations are to some extent creatures
of speculation and conjecture. But the approach proposed here is less arbitrary
than the Seventh Circuit's solution in Sure-Tan. At the same time, this
approach fills the need for enforcement of employment law mandates. With-
out some approach of this type, the remedy of back pay would join rein-
statement as a forbidden remedy for employees no longer in the United States.
If we dispense with back pay and reinstatement, we markedly reduce deter-
rence of employers' illegal activity. The approach outlined above preserves
deterrence.
The reinstatement of an undocumented person who is absent from the
United States creates problems of a different order. These problems, more-
over, resist solution. Consequently, reinstatement should not be available to
complainants in this group.
The central problem is that offering reinstatement to a victim absent from
the United States encourages the victim to reenter the United States illegally.
Indeed, such an offer is consistent with the two main criteria critical to an
effective scheme of sanctions. 5 9 First, the undocumented worker would have
access to information about the offer, since the NLRB or the employer would
be required to attempt to notify him. Second, the sanction (or, here, the
reward) would be closely linked with the conduct-illegal re-entry into the
United States-which one wishes to deter. Undocumented persons come to
the United States primarily to seek employment. A court's offer of a job,
under this analysis, would certainly trigger illegal immigration.'16 Barring
reinstatement, however, would remove that impetus.
Another policy rationale also supports barring reinstatement for persons
who have left the United States. Reinstatement, if it encouraged illegal re-
entry, would set the stage for possible added costs to taxpayers. These costs
would, at a minimum, involve educating the children of the undocumented
person. If, on the other hand, the family of the undocumented person, along
with the undocumented person herself, is no longer physically present in the
United States, costs in education, other services, or government benefits will
not arise. Thus, barring reinstatement for an undocumented person who lives
outside of the United States diminishes the likelihood that the victim and the
family will return to the United States. This effect tends to reduce costs to
taxpayers.
159. See supra notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
160. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984). But see NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc.,
672 F.2d 592, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1982) (reinstatement conditioned on legal re-entry is not incentive
for illegal re-entry), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); Note, Retaliatory Reporting,
supra note 15, at 1310 (same). Conditioning reinstatement on legal re-entry is of dubious utility,
however, because the person will most likely not be able to meet the test for legal admittance
to the United States. Note, Retaliatory Reporting, supra note 15, at 1310.
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Both crucial policy elements, deterring illegal immigration and minimizing
taxpayer transfers to undocumented persons, support the barring of reinstate-
ment for undocumented workers who have left the United States. The deter-
rent effect on employment law violations may weaken slightly. The employer's
capacity to violate employment law with regard to undocumented workers
may also, as usual, tend to frustrate immigration policy by enhancing em-
ployer demand for undocumented labor. 16 On balance, however, immigration
policy counsels the elimination of reinstatement as a remedy for absent
victims.
Another, more legalistic, way of viewing this exception is to say that a
conflict exists between immigration and employment policy on this issue.
Since Congress enacted immigration legislation which is more recent and
specific, its policies underlying immigration law should prevail. 62 Reinstate-
ment, therefore, should not be available to victims who are absent from the
United States.
2. The Employer's Compliance with the IRCA
The second exceptional situation involves an employer who has complied
with the IRCA, but who has also violated a non-grandfathered undocumented
161. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. An employer whose undocumented labor
force is organizing might be sorely tempted to notify the INS of his employees' status, even if
this conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice. Lightening the sanctions for such illegal conduct
would encourage the behavior. Employees would be intimidated by the prospect of deportation.
They would tolerate other illegal employer practices, such as substandard wages, illegally long
hours, and unsafe working conditions for the same reason. This perpetuation of inadequate
terms of employment would encourage employers to hire more undocumented workers and
ultimately trigger more illegal immigration.
This is a powerful argument. Two factors, however, make the scenario outlined above less
plausible. First, under the model proposed in this Article, back pay would still be available.
Back pay awards oblige an employer to surrender much, if not all, of the gain derived from
this kind of unlawful behavior. Some gain lingers, nevertheless, since employees might well prefer
a job in the United States to receipt of back pay in another country. An employer's threat to
notify the INS might still intimidate these employees. This is where the second factor emerges.
Under the IRCA, an employer must document his efforts to verify a non-grandfathered em-
ployee's legal presence in the United States. An employer who cannot document these efforts
violates the law. Presumably, many employers who know that some of their employees are
undocumented fall under this rubric. If those employers inform the INS about their employees'
status, they are also informing on themselves. Most employers will not want to run that risk.
They may therefore be less willing to commit this unfair labor practice than one would at first
suppose. Reducing the incidence of the violation will, as usual, ultimately tend to reduce the
number of employers who frustrate immigration policy.
162. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984) (holding that detailed
provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act preempted access to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21
(1981) (holding that Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 barred recourse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)); Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), bars recourse
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380-90 (1983) (holding that
detailed statutory protections of federal civil service employees, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-43 (1982),
barred recourse to remedy inferred from Constitution).
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worker's employment rights. This situation also precipitates a potential clash
of immigration and employment concerns. The resolution of this conflict is
similar: bar reinstatement and modify the calculation of back pay.
The situation in which an employer complies with the IRCA but still hires
an undocumented worker may seem anomalous. Congress, after all, designed
the IRCA to stop employers from hiring undocumented workers. However,
employer compliance with the IRCA will not always accomplish that goal.
A hypothetical situation illustrates this point. Suppose an employer, call it
Sleazy, Inc., hires an undocumented worker after November 6, 1986. The
employer, however, does not know that the employee is undocumented,
because the employer complied with the IRCA by asking for documentation
of the employee's lawful residence in the United States 6 and the employee's
documentation appeared to be in order. In fact, the employee forged the
documents. Later, but immediately before a union election in which Sleazy's
workforce would determine whether a union had the right to act as its
collective bargaining agent, the company fires the incognito undocumented
employee. The employee had become known as a key advocate of unioni-
zation. Sleazy's manager tells the fired worker, "You do good work, but
you're a union person and we just can't afford to have your kind around."
The discharged employee complains to the NLRB, which brings an unfair
labor practice proceeding against Sleazy.
Sleazy's conduct offends employment law values more than it offends
immigration policy. Sleazy has in fact committed an unfair labor practice.
To prove that Sleazy has committed an unfair labor practice in this context,
the NLRB must demonstrate that the company acted with an anti-union
animus.'6 Sleazy's anti-union animus was clear. The company cannot advance
any other reason to account plausibly for the employee's discharge, in light
of his concededly "good work."
From an immigration perspective, however, Sleazy's behavior is more
benign. The main immigration policy rationale for according undocumented
employees the same remedies as other workers is the notion that comprehen-
sive relief for both documented and undocumented workers reduces employ-
ers' demand for vulnerable, easily exploited, undocumented labor. Sleazy
complied with the IRCA. It did not consciously exploit the special vulnerability
of undocumented workers. Under these circumstances, the immigration policy
rationale evaporates.
The lack of a positive immigration policy rationale in this situation is fatal
to any argument for a reinstatement remedy. The situation under discussion
embodies this shift. Sleazy was apparently pleased to hire lawful residents. It
inadvertently hired an undocumented worker. Sleazy's discharge of the un-
documented worker creates a job opening which Sleazy could fill with a
lawful resident. If a court or agency deprives lawful residents of this oppor-
163. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
164. E.g., Edward G. Budd. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943).
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tunity, the result frustrates immigration policy. Reinstatement is therefore
inappropriate. 65
Notwithstanding the difficulties with reinstatement, court awarded back
pay does not precipitate comparable conflicts with immigration policy. Job
seekers who are lawful residents do not suffer when a court renders a decision
granting monetary relief against an employer. In contrast, if we deny undoc-
umented employees monetary relief, such a result frustrates employment law
values.
When employers intimidate employees, they frustrate a central policy un-
derlying the NLRA: the promotion of industrial peace through the channelling
of employer/employee disputes through the collective bargaining process.66
Employers' intimidation strategies create pent-up employee resentment. This
employee resentment eventually expresses itself in disruption, sabotage and
violence. Negotiation is impossible in such a climate. In order to promote
negotiation, employee resentment must be minimized. Employers must be
deterred from intimidating employees in order to reach this goal.
In the hypothetical situation, deterring Sleazy's conduct is of the utmost
importance. Equally important is the effect of the company's actions on
employees who are still working for Sleazy. The company sends a message
to these employees that their participation in union activity is a risky business
which may cost them their jobs. The employees' diminished ardor for labor
organizing is the likely and intended consequence of Sleazy's conduct.
Remedies play a vital role in countering this effect. A mere prohibitory
injunction or cease and desist order will not deter Sleazy from taking similar
illegal action the next time employees' organizing activities threaten its per-
ceived prerogatives. Court issued cease and desist orders alone will also not
be sufficient to restore employees' confidence in their ability to organize
without fear of management reprisals. 61 7 A system attempting to promote
165. But cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (barring employer from discharging amnesty candidates who had
presented false documentation of lawful residence when they applied for employment prior to
IRCA's effective date).
A broader view of employment policy might also support denying reinstatement to non-
grandfathered workers who presented false documentation to their employers. Under this analysis,
such employees would be deceiving their employers, as well as placing them at risk of investigation
by the INS for violating the IRCA. Employment relations are damaged, in this view, when they
do not take place in an atmosphere of trust. Freeing the employer from an obligation to reinstate
employees in this context would promote cooperation and trust between management and labor.
Establishing a cooperative framework is one goal of national employment policy. See also Posner,
Skepticism, supra note 123, at 852-53 (discussing case of heir murdering testator, see supra note
118, where court barred murderous heir from taking under will, as a product of broader
interpretation of wills statute, embodying common sense assumption that testator would not
have wished his murderer to inherit).
166. See Mendez, supra note 17, at 722.
167. The need for a back pay remedy is even more compelling when, under the above
circumstances, other documented employees initially react to the discharge of undocumented
colleagues not with demoralization, but with support. Suppose that Sleazy also fires these
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deterrence and employee confidence must make the remedy of back pay
available to employee victims. 16 The mention of back pay raises the next
issue: How should an employer's knowledge of an employee's undocumented
status subsequent to accrual of the employee's cause of action under federal
employment law affect the court's computation of a monetary award? Should
Sleazy, if it discovered a complainant's undocumented status three months
after discharging that employee, owe less back pay than if it discovered the
employee's status one year after his discharge? Suppose Sleazy informed the
INS about the complainant's status when it learned of this status, after Sleazy
received notice of the employee's complaint. If the INS spends six months,
instead of a week, adjudicating the complainant's status and engineering his
departure from the United States, should Sleazy owe more because of the
time differential?169
The simple answer this Article proposes to this series of questions is that
neither the timing of the employer's knowledge nor the length of time
necessary for an INS decision precipitated by a tip from the employer should
be dispositive for purposes of a court's computation of a back pay award.
Rather, the amount of back pay should be contingent on five factors: 1) the
timing of INS action independent of any tip from the employer; 2) the timing
of an employer's offer of reinstatement, provided that the employee receives
the offer before the employer actually discovers the employee's status; 3) in
cases where the employer has already learned of the employee's illegal status,
the timing of an employer's offer of back pay without its offering reinstate-
ment; 4) the timing of the employee's commencement of work at another,
comparable, job; and, 5) the timing of an NLRB order finding that the
employees. This action is clearly an illegal retaliation if undocumented workers are protected by
the NLRA. If, however, undocumented employees are not covered by the statute, the documented
employees may be required to prove that they did not know that the first discharged employees
were undocumented. Proving a negative is always difficult. It might be especially burdensome
here, where the factfinder might be inclined to think that co-workers share confidences, even
when management is not privy to employee secrets such as immigration status. If undocumented
employees do not receive NLRA protections, employees who stick up for them but cannot
convincingly demonstrate that they were ignorant of their colleagues' undocumented status run
the risk of also being left out in the cold. This risk encourages two reactions by employees: 1)
do not protest management actions which appear to be designed to intimidate union-minded
workers; or, 2) seek to discover one's colleagues' immigration status before supporting them.
Both reactions stifle pro-union activity. The second reaction might promote employees snooping
on each other or coercing colleagues into disclosing information. This result divides the labor
force and gives a single-minded employer a substantial advantage in neutralizing effective
employee organizing. Employees who snoop on each other with respect to immigration issues
will be less likely to trust one another in dealing collectively with management. Avoiding these
undesirable phenomena requires that the NLRA both cover undocumented workers and afford
them relief beyond cease and desist orders.
168. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
169. The Comment, Illegal Aliens, supra note 16, appears to recommend that back pay be
measured from the date of discharge to the date of "official determination of the aliens'
immigration status." Id. at 855.
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employer committed an unfair labor practice by initially discharging the
employee.
All of these factors are not likely to be present in any single case. But at
least one factor will typically be available to help a court shape a fair back
pay award. In cases where the court is presented with more than one factor,
the factor perfected first in time should cut off the accrual of back pay. The
following paragraphs explain the operation of these variables.
Factor one, INS action which is independent of the employer, has already
been thoroughly discussed. 70 To restate briefly, an employer should not have
to pay for time during which an employee, because of INS action unrelated
to the employer, is unavailable for work. Suppose an employer unlawfully
discharged an employee making $1,000 per month on May 1, 1988. The INS
raided the employee's former workplace on June 1, 1988. Sleazy should only
be liable for one month's back pay, or $1,000. Factor one, therefore, elimi-
nates excessive and overly speculative awards against employers.
Factor two operates to push employers and employees toward settlement. 71
Under factor two, an employer's offer of reinstatement tolls back pay.7 2
Using the salary and discharge dates set out above as a constant throughout
this discussion of computing back pay, suppose that Sleazy makes a rein-
statement offer on June 1, 1988. The employee rejects the offer. Sleazy is
again liable only for one month's back pay-1,000. 73
Factor three continues the system's emphasis on settlement. Under factor
three, when the employer discovers the employee's non-grandfathered status,
the employer is barred from offering to reinstate the employee. However, the
employer may still offer back pay. The relevant period the court must consider
for back pay purposes extends from the date of the employee's discharge to
the date on which the employee receives the employer's offer. This feature,
like the provision allowing for a reinstatement offer which tolls back pay in
factor two, gives Sleazy an incentive to make an offer quickly. Factor three
works in the following manner: Sleazy discovered the employee's non-grand-
fathered status on July 1, 1988. Thus far Sleazy owes the employee two
months back pay, or $2,000. However, the company does not offer the
employee this amount until August 1, 1988. The employee, under factor
three, is also entitled to back pay for the month of July. This results in the
170. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of legal devices designed to encourage settlement in another area, see
Margulies, supra note 128 (analyzing settlement devices in area of statutory attorney's fee awards
for prevailing plaintiffs).
172. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (offer of position for which plaintiff
applied tolls employer's back pay liability in federal job discrimination action).
173. If, however, an employee accepts reinstatement and an employer subsequently discovers
the employee is a non-grandfathered worker with forged papers, the employer should be permitted
to discharge the employee. This second discharge should not be considered an unfair labor
practice, since its primary motivation is compliance with the employer sanctions provisions of
the IRCA. The employer, in offering reinstatement, has sought to remedy his previous unfair
labor practice.
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employee's maximum award of $2,000 plus $1,000 = $3,000. An earlier offer
would have reduced Sleazy's liability.
Factor four similarly encourages the parties to help themselves. This factor
requires an employee to seek other comparable work, and tolls back pay at
the point an employee accepts another job. The fact that this factor requires
an employee to mitigate her damages removes the incentive for a discharged
employee to remain idle. As a result, factor four also helps reduce the impact
of employee idleness on her family members. Such family members may go
without necessities if the employee fails to promptly obtain a new source of
income. When the system reduces the adverse impact of the employee's
discharge on the health of the employee's family, it minimizes taxpayer
transfers to undocumented persons. Suppose that the employee, according to
the NLRB, could have found a new job at the same salary by July 1, 1988.
However, the employee failed to look for a position. Sleazy would be liable
for two months back pay, or $2,000. The same result would obtain if, on
July 1, the employee in fact found a new job at the same salary. This outcome
encourages productive use of human resources.
Finally, factor five, the timing of the NLRB's final order, is helpful both
in the promotion of settlement and in allowing a court to set a date for the
employer's maximum back pay exposure. An employer should not be held
responsible for paying a discharged employee indefinitely. 174 The system
should allow the employer to discern clearly the costs of his foregoing
settlement. Suppose Sleazy makes no offer to the employee. The employee
stays in this country, available for work. Although he tries to find a job, he
does not succeed. The NLRB reaches a decision on May 1, 1989. Sleazy,
under factor five, owes the employee the equivalent of one year of his salary-
$12,000. If the employer made an offer prior to the NLRB decision, the
court would reduce this amount, as factors two and three provide. By
establishing a point of maximum exposure contingent on the timing of the
NLRB's decision, factor five encourages employers to settle before reaching
that point.
The five factors this Article discussed. above accommodate both employment
law and immigration values. A decision-maker's use of these factors would
preserve a back pay remedy and, consequently, deter employers from violating
employment law. At the same time, barring the employer from making a
reinstatement offer once he learns of the employee's undocumented status
satisfies the immigration objective of promoting employment opportunities
for lawful residents. The balance which these factors build into the proposed
approach makes it a worthwhile solution to a difficult problem.
3. Summary
The previous subsections of this Article modify the model of comprehensive
relief for particular situations. Cease and desist orders would still be available
174. Extending the employer's obligation for back pay indefinitely would soak up the em-
ployer's resources and inhibit the employer from hiring lawful residents and citizens. This result
would clash with immigration policy.
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as remedies to all employees in all situations. However, certain circumstances
must limit the ability of a given court to award back pay and reinstatement
even under the comprehensive approach.
Circumstances require a court to limit back pay in two contexts. In the
first context, the undocumented worker has left the United States for reasons
unrelated to any action taken by the employer. In the second context, the
employer complied with the employee verification provisions of the IRCA.
However, after the employer committed an unfair labor practice, it discovered
that the victim of the practice is undocumented and the employer either
offered the victim reinstatement before it discovered the employee's undo-
cumented status, or offered accrued back pay after it discovered the employ-
ee's status.
Circumstances also require limitations on the remedy of reinstatement.
Reinstatement is inappropriate: 1) when the undocumented worker has left
the United States; or, 2) when the undocumented worker is a non-grandfath-
ered employee under the IRCA who presented forged documentation of lawful
residence or citizenship to his employer. In all other contexts, reinstatement
should be available.
The foregoing modifications attempt to reconcile employment law remedies
and immigration concerns. However, one may still have visceral objections
to the model of comprehensive relief. The next section of this Article discusses
these objections.
V. THREE THRESHOLD OBJECTIONS To TIE MODEL
There are three principal objections to the broad availability of remedies
approach as it relates to undocumented workers. The first objection is that
a reinstatement remedy conflicts with the IRCA in all situations, not just the
exceptional situations discussed in Part IV of this Article. The second objec-
tion is that a system which provides an undocumented worker with compre-
hensive remedies compensates that person to a greater extent than any equitable
measure of make-whole relief because it restores the undocumented worker
to a position which he occupied only through his own illegal conduct. The
third objection is that regardless of the result permitted under a fair account
of the IRCA and remedial theory, granting undocumented workers make-
whole relief damages lawful residents' and citizens' sense of United States
sovereignty. Each of these objections merits separate consideration.
A. The IRCA and Reinstatement
Awarding reinstatement to a non-grandfathered employee seems to carry
the counterintuitive character of this Article's approach to a peculiar ex-
treme. 175 After all, Congress specifically prohibits employers from hiring non-
175. Even before passage of the IRCA, the Supreme Court expressed doubts about the
appropriateness of reinstatement of undocumented workers. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1047 n.4 (1984) (dicta); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984).
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grandfathered workers .176 By ordering reinstatement of non-grandfathered
employees, courts and agencies would thus appear to sanction the performance
of an illegal act. A court awarded remedy should never be contrary to the
law, no matter how benign its purpose.' 77
The effects of court awarded reinstatement reinforce this anomaly. Such
awards would seem to clash fundamentally with immigration policy. That
policy clearly seeks to promote jobs for United States citizens and lawful
residents. When an employer discharges an undocumented worker, the em-
ployer creates a job opening, despite the fact that the discharge constituted
a violation of federal employment law. A United States citizen or lawful
resident could fill this opening. If one precludes this possibility by ordering
the employer to reinstate the undocumented worker, such an order seems to
undermine a key goal of immigration policy by reducing the number of
positions available for United States citizens and residents.
The appearance of conflict between reinstatement and the IRCA sometimes
reflects reality, but in other situations, it is a mirage. A crucial element one
must consider is whether the employer has complied with the employment
verification procedures set out in the IRCA.17 1 If the employer complied with
the IRCA, reinstatement does not serve, and may actually damage, immigra-
tion policy. 79 Indeed, under the modifications of the comprehensive model
proposed in this Article, reinstatement would not be appropriate. In other
situations, however, the outcome is different.
When the employer has failed to comply with IRCA procedures, reinstate-
ment is an appropriate remedy. The presence of economic factors illuminates
this distinction. Employers who are backed into a corner due to economic
pressures are least likely to comply with a documentation verification process.
They are most likely to knowingly hire exploitable undocumented employees.
These employers will resist hiring the more demanding United States citizens
or lawful residents. This is true even if, as in this case, the employer has an
opening as a result of the discharge of an undocumented employee who has
asserted federal employment rights. Other undocumented workers are the
most probable candidates for this position.
If the law does not insist on reinstatement of the complainant, it in effect
permits the employer to hire another undocumented worker who is ripe for
exploitation. The reinstated employee will at least gain the benefit of the
176. A non-grandfathered worker is one without proper authorization from the Attorney
General, hired after November 6, 1986, the effective date of the IRCA. See supra text between
notes 30-31 (discussing categories of undocumented persons). The IRCA prohibits employers
from hiring individuals who fall within the non-grandfathered worker category. See 8 U.S.C. §
1324a (Supp. IV 1986).
177. See, e.g., Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (holding that affirmative action
program which forced layoff of employees with seniority violated Title VII).
178. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
179. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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terms and conditions mandated by federal employment law. 8 ° No comparable
guarantees are realistic for the new undocumented hire.
Viewed in this light, the issue shifts back to a now familiar query: which
situation is better for immigration policy generally, judicial enforcement or
neglect of federal employment law standards? Under this Article's approach,
the judicial enforcement of employment law option is considered superior.
Thus, in situations where the employer has violated the IRCA, reinstatement
is consistent with immigration policy.
One may make the counterargument that policy does not necessarily con-
stitute law. If the text of the IRCA clearly barred reinstatement for undoc-
umented workers, the faulty policy underpinnings of this statutory language
would not detract from the language's legal force. However, the text of the
IRCA is silent on this point. Other guidance is therefore necessary.
Legislative history lends definition to the IRCA's language. While legislative
history is not as authoritative as the text of a statute, it is a valuable guide
to interpretation when the text is silent or unclear.' 8 Because the text of the
IRCA is silent with respect to undocumented workers and employment law
remedies, the legislative history is the best resource available to discover
Congress' collective opinion on this topic.
The legislative history of the IRCA argues for judicial imposition of
comprehensive employment law remedies, including reinstatement, for un-
documented workers. Congress included as part of the IRCA's legislative
history a disavowal of intent to "in any way" limit courts' or agencies'
remedial choices in enforcing federal employment law.' 82 This disclaimer
demonstrates that Congress perceived no contradiction between effective
180. Awarding reinstatement would not affect the IRCA's enforcement mechanism. That is,
an employer-say, our friend Slimy, Inc.-whom a court or agency had ordered to reinstate an
undocumented worker would still have to report his failure to verify the non-grandfathered
worker's citizenship status to the INS. In addition, the INS on its own, either through a spot
raid or acting on a tip, could inspect Slimy's records and premises, apprehend the reinstated
employee, and cite Slimy for a violation of the IRCA's employer sanctions provisions.
This result may seem harsh to Slimy, which is being made to pay twice: first, for an employment
law violation, and, second, for a violation of the IRCA. However, this perception neglects
Slimy's role. Slimy, Inc., lived up to its name by knowingly hiring undocumented workers or
failing to verify their status with the intention of exploiting this source of captive labor. Under
the circumstances, a double dose of sanctions seems fitting. Slimy could have avoided either
sanction by simply following the IRCA's mandate on verification procedures. The procedures
are straightforward. If Slimy does not follow them because it wishes to break the law, it should
not complain too strenuously about the consequences.
181. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 546-52 (1940). For differing
views on the legitimacy and utility of legislative history, compare Hirschey v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (members of
Congress do not read or write committee reports); Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 196 (1986)
(legislators are unaware of legislative history), with Posner, supra note 23, at 274-75 (legislative
history may accurately reflect deal between special interests which triggered enactment of statute).
182. See H.R. REP. No. 682 (I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNo. & ADauN. NEWS 5662.
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immigration policy and undocumented workers' access to strong employment
law remedies.
A court or agency which minimizes the import of this legislative history
when considering the issue of reinstatement should be prepared to go beyond
an explanation of why its ordering of reinstatement is counterintuitive. The
counterintuitive nature of reinstatement in this context is obvious. The court
or agency must also explain why the analysis which equates full and effective
employment law remedies with immigration policy is incorrect. If the court
or agency is unable to demonstrate the flaw in this analysis, it should not
bar reinstatement.
B. The Undocumented Worker and Make- Whole Relief
The counterintuitive nature of comprehensive relief for undocumented
workers affects not only the issue of compliance with the IRCA, but also
the issue of consistency with equitable principles. A central principle of equity
holds that only the petitioner with "clean hands" need apply.'83 The undoc-
183. See D. DOBBS, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4, at 45-46 (1973); Plater,
supra note 118, at 537.
Equity has a myriad of meanings. One such meaning encompasses general principles of justice,
morality, and fairness, and can be articulated as: "No person should profit from her own
wrong." Sometimes the law, as written, neglects even these principles when it is confronted with
a case comprised of compelling facts. In this situation, equity acts as a residual source of
morality. See ARiSTOTLE, supra note 46, at 141-42. Equity can also be a source of values for
interpreting statutes so as to avoid unfair or absurd results. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y.
506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (discussed supra note 118); Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:
A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDozo L. REv. 799, 802-35 (1985); Marcin, Epeikeia:
Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes, 10 CONN. L. REv. 377 (1978); Moore, A
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279 (1985). This role of equity has
developed an institutional character in the legal system. Equity courts existed in English law to
consider individual circumstances and shape remedies accordingly; this was in contrast with the
strict legal interpretation to which the court of law was bound. In America, after equity and
law courts merged, courts retained wide discretion in granting equitable relief. As the Supreme
Court has stated, equity permits the court to "mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman,
411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) ("in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a
special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable") (citations omitted). The
flexibility characteristic of equitable determinations, however, can collide with federal courts'
insistence on "judicially . . . manageable standards." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (962)
(outlining criteria which, if satisfied, qualify issue as "political question" outside judicial com-
petence). See also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978) (rejecting immersion
in "fine utilitarian calculations" regarding whether completion of dam was more important than
preserving species of snail darter). Cf. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv.
L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978) (discussing disadvantages of judicial process for coping with multi-
variable or "polycentric" problems such as setting of prices).
The area of remedies has been fertile ground for debate about manageable standards and the
scope of judicial discretion in fashioning relief. Compare Farber, supra note 118 (seeking to
articulate limits on judicial discretion in declining to issue injunctions); Plater, supra note 118
(same); Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 382 (1983)
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umented person has rights in the United States merely as a result of his illegal
act-entering or remaining in this country without proper authorization. It
thus seems inappropriate that a court or agency of the United States should
invoke its remedial power for the benefit of individuals who would be
absolutely without right of recourse if they had not acted illegally in the first
instance. 8 4 It can therefore be argued that an undocumented person has
unclean hands and should not be heard to ask a court for equitable relief.
This unclean hands view is consistent with the argument behind the "re-
ward" rationale for opposing employment law remedies for undocumented
workers.'85 Under this view, a court or agency which awards monetary relief
or reinstatement to an undocumented worker seems to allow that individual
to profit from his own wrong. As a general matter, American law views such
bounty as offensive.1 6 Why should courts and agencies allow undocumented
workers to enjoy relief which contradicts this bedrock principle?
Answering that question requires one to scrutinize undocumented persons'
level of knowledge and motivation. Undocumented persons know that their
presence in the United States violates United States law. They are furtive,
isolated and vulnerable precisely as a result of this knowledge. They are
motivated by the prospect of a higher standard of living. Undocumented
persons, therefore, lack the "good will," defined as the absence of self-
interest,s7 which ideally prompts all human activity.'88
(same); with Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAgv. L. Rv. 1281
(1976) (expressing confidence in court's ability to act as broker for different interests in context
of reforming institutions such as prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and school systems); Schoenbrod,
supra note 118 (arguing for courts having maximum discretion to deny injunctive relief). For
purposes of this Article, any use of "equity" will do.
184. This is especially true under statutes like Title VII, which make remedies a matter for
the court's equitable discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 415-25 (1975).
185. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
186. See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (reading inheritance statute as
precluding inheritance by heir who had murdered testator). See also supra note 118 for a complete
discussion of Riggs.
187. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRAs 9-22 (Library of Liberal Arts
ed. 1959) (arguing that nothing is wholly good, regardless of its effect, except a good will). Cf.
J. RAwLs, supra note 46, at 136-42 (positing "original position" in which "veil of ignorance"
cloaks knowledge of individual interests and circumstances, thereby facilitating disinterested
colloquy on principles of justice).
188. But see Comment, Human Rights, supra note 16 (arguing that one's ability to seek
employment in another country is a fundamental human right). Public distrust of one who acts
out of self-interest does not prevent the legal system from rewarding people like personal injury
plaintiffs, their lawyers, or informants who expose criminal behavior. These people act out of
self-interest. Cf. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L.
Rav. 669, 669-73 & nn. 1-10 (1986) (discussing view of plaintiff's attorney as opportunist sacrificing
public good for private gain). Similarly, informants may also have acted illegally. These com-
promises of the ideal of acting without self-interest are acceptable because instrumental objectives
such as detecting and deterring tortfeasors and criminals justify departure from the ideal of
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The undocumented worker's self-interest and knowledge of the illegality of
her conduct raises the possibility that she will act strategically, by manipulating
legal rules for her own advantage. 9 In theory, one rule which is susceptible
selfless will and conduct. Cf. id. (discussing benefits of plaintiff's attorney involvement in legal
system). See generally W. JAMEs, supra note 48, at 61 (pragmatic view considers only "what
works best in the way of leading us").
189. The law's treatment of states of mind reflects this possibility of abuse. The insanity
defense, for example, might seem much less compelling in a given case if a jury heard evidence
that the defendant, who had no previous psychiatric history, had attended a lecture on the
insanity defense the day before she committed the act for which she was charged. See Margulies,
supra note 155, at 806 n.85 (discussing fear that defendants will "fake" insanity defense to
escape punishment). See also Dan-Cohen, supra note 76, at 638 ("defense of necessity, when
based on self-interest, may be allowed most confidently in situations in which the actor did not
know of its availability at the time of his criminal conduct"). The military's treatment of "section
8" discharges for mental illness reveals a similar concern. Fictional accounts of war ascribe to
the military the view that a soldier who did something "crazy" and then asked for a § 8 discharge
on grounds of mental illness could not possess the state of mind required by § 8. That soldier
merely wanted to escape from the war. Because getting out of the war is an eminently sane
objective, the soldier could not possibly be crazy. See J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955). Corporal
Klinger, of M*A*S*H, repeatedly tried the same tactic. He never persuaded his superiors.
Another related example involves a defendant's knowledge of his Miranda rights. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (announcing incantation of rights which arresting officers could
recite to all suspects to defeat claims of coerced confessions). A defendant with extensive
experience with police officers and the criminal justice system may be held to know his rights
to remain silent and to consult with a lawyer. Even the failure of the interrogating officers to
recite the Miranda warnings may not render a statement from such a knowing defendant
involuntary. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hall, 605 F.2d 577, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1979) ("record indicates
that appellant was no stranger to police stations or to police questioning"). When courts consider
the defendant's level of knowledge, they prevent manipulation of the voluntariness standard and
abuse of the logic of Miranda warnings. The Miranda warnings are designed to convey knowledge
to a defendant who is in the intimidating and confusing environment of custodial interrogation.
It would be incongruous for a court to permit a knowing defendant to take advantage of the
lack of warnings and suppress incriminating statements when the defendant's level of knowledge
rendered the warnings unnecessary in his case.
The doctrine of reliance in contract law, as well as the doctrine of duress in contract and in
criminal law, is susceptible to similar effects. Suppose an individual feels pressure from others
to perform an illegal act. Suppose he is also aware of the exculpating effect of duress. Under
these circumstances, he may perform the act even if he does not truly feel the mortal threat
which the duress doctrine contemplates. This individual, if he is later successful in pleading
duress, has manipulated the system. See supra note 76 (citing literature on how parties' awareness
of doctrine distorts outcomes). Cf. O.W. HoLmEs, supra note 123 (deriding law's traditional
emphasis on subjective tests examining individual states of mind and intentions, and tracing
progress in law as function of shift to objective standards); Holmes, supra note 48, at 463-64
(same); Posner, Skepticism, supra note 123, at 866-71 (urging utility of economic analysis over
subjective inquiries about states of mind).
One commentator has argued cogently that fear of pervasive manipulation accounts for the
historic absence of doctrines like duress from statutes and their presence, instead, in the more
arcane reaches of case law. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 76, at 630-39. Under this view, because
statutes are more readily available and accessible to the general public, doctrines which excuse
otherwise culpable conduct should not be included in statutes. Inclusion would publicize the
doctrines and promote manipulation. Because case law is often available only to specialized
audiences, restricting mention of doctrines like duress to judicial decisions does not pose the
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to this type of manipulation is a rule which permits undocumented workers
to recover for employment law violations. Manipulation would assume the
following form: the undocumented person would illegally enter the United
States in search of a job, knowing that his entry violated the law. This person
would also know that, regardless of his illegal conduct, he would be entitled
to employment law rights and remedies. The availability of such rights and
remedies in this context could encourage illegal immigration, a result that is
condemned by the reward theory. Conversely, it can be argued that if we
eliminated employment law rights and remedies for undocumented workers,
we would remove this potential reward.
Two factors, however, render employment law remedies for undocumented
workers more palatable and less a reward for wrongdoing. First, undocu-
mented workers typically lack specific knowledge of their rights; hence, the
culpability that is characteristic of actors who are most likely to act strate-
gically is missing. This level of guilty knowledge often involves awareness of
legal rules. With knowledge of legal rules, strategic actors may manipulate
the system.190
A classic example of attempted manipulation is the case in which the heir
murders the testator. 9' The heir, one may assume, did his deed knowing that
the law of wills provided for passing of the testator's estate to him, with no
stated exception based on the manner of the testator's demise. The heir relied
on this rule. Only the judicial creation of an exception under such lurid
circumstances spoiled his plans.
Manipulation of the legal system, in contrast, is an unlikely scenario for
undocumented workers. Undocumented workers are usually unfamiliar with
United States employment law. 192 Their criminal act-illegal entry-therefore
cannot flow from a plan to secure employment rights and remedies. Viewed
from this perspective, employment law remedies for undocumented workers
are a fortuitous consequence of illegal behavior, not a true reward. 93
same risk of broad based knowledge and its resulting strategic behavior. Courts can restrict
application of the doctrine to after-the-fact cases involving isolated individuals deserving judicial
or jury solicitude. The threat of exceptions, such as duress, swallowing up rules against, for
example, murder or breach of contract, is thereby diminished.
This is one explanation for the judicial, as opposed to statutory, evolution of equitable
doctrines which excuse or mitigate consequences of illegal acts. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 76,
at 665 n.109. It also may furnish a rationale, in the immigration context, for the proposition
that Congress should discuss the need to make employment law remedies available for undocu-
mented workers only in legislative history, which lawyers, judges, and law professors and law
students look to, instead of in the IRCA's text, which may enjoy more general attention. In the
immigration setting, as elsewhere, restricting knowledge of doctrines that under certain circum-
stances undercut basic rules, such as the rules against illegal immigration, will reduce the likelihood
of manipulation that corrupts those rules.
190. See supra note 189.
191. See supra note 118.
192. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 76.
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The second factor which renders employment law remedies for undocu-
mented workers more palatable is that economic forces affect this population
in a way that they cannot control. These economic forces stem from domestic
employer demand for exploitable labor. It is employer demand that triggers
illegal immigration. The murderous heir, by comparison, was master of his
own fate.
The involvement of employers in illegal immigration alters the balance of
equities. 94 A court that deprives the heir of his ill-gotten legacy affects only
the heir. However, a court that disallows make-whole relief for the victimized
undocumented worker does not affect the worker alone. Such disallowance
also fails to eliminate the profit gained by the employer through the person's
illegal entry into the United States. When the court denies the employee
make-whole relief, it simply redistributes that profit from the employee to
the employer. 95 The employer may generate savings by paying an illegally
low wage or discouraging union membership through the discharge of union
activists. Equity must concern itself with depriving the employer of this
reward.'96 Providing make-whole relief to undocumented workers accom-
plishes that goal.
Some disquiet may linger about invoking such an instrumental view of law,
based on a system which designs means to fulfill ends, as a justification for
"rewarding" a wrongdoer like the undocumented worker. A temptation arises
to remove any possible reward for both employers and employees. One way
to accomplish this design is to bar all remedies for undocumented workers,
while imposing fines on employers, payable to the Treasury, equal to the
194. See supra note 183.
195. Cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 34 (1960) ("the problem is
to devise practical arrangements which will correct defects in one part of the system without
causing more serious harm in other parts").
196. This concern with deterring wrongdoing by those who deal with undocumented persons
helps to account for state court decisions holding that undocumented persons have the right to
recover for civil wrongs. See, e.g., Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 100, 401
A.2d 1102 (App. Div. 1979) (undocumented person can sue to enforce contract for automobile
insurance). See also Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1446 n.69, 1454-55 &
nn.107-12 (citing cases). See generally Comment, The Right of an Illegal Alien to Maintain a
Civil Action, 63 CALIn. L. RaV. 762 (1975) (discussing constitutional basis of undocumented
persons' right to sue). The fact that the employer is at least as much to blame as the undocumented
worker for the conduct which results in the violation of employment law disposes of the principal
concern of commentators who emphasize justice over utility. These commentators have expressed
the fear that deciding cases based on utilitarian factors like superior knowledge of applicable
law and fit between sanctions and undesirable conduct, see supra notes 68-101 and accompanying
text, would impose injustice in particular cases where the party which would prevail using
utilitarian factors-in the instant situation, the employee-is nevertheless more at fault. See
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 547 n.40 (1972) (criticizing
Calabresi's view of tort law, which holds that party generally better able to avoid accidents
should always absorb accidents' costs). An employer who has committed an employment law
violation is in no position to complain about his victim's violation of the immigration laws.
Society can still complain, however, before "rewarding" the undocumented employee.
[Vol. 38:553
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
savings realized by the violating employer. Unfortunately, the strength of this
approach is illusory.
The allure and ultimate failure of the above model flows from the difference
between the after-the-fact and before-the-fact perspectives.197 After the fact,
the model using only fines against the employer is indeed optimal. The model
ensures that neither employer nor employee receive any reward for wrong-
doing. Before the fact, however, the model is problematic. A regime of fines
which are payable to the Treasury provides no incentive for victims to
volunteer information. 98 This lack of incentive undermines enforcement ef-
197. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing after-the-fact (ex post) and
before-the-fact (ex ante) perspectives on importance of confidentiality). After the fact, it seems
jarring to reward an undocumented worker with back pay and reinstatement instead of appre-
hending and deporting her when she comes forward, thereby making her illegal stay in the United
States as difficult as possible. From a policy-oriented, before-the-fact perspective, however,
employment law remedies for undocumented workers are a useful means of reducing employer
demand for undocumented labor and thereby minimizing taxpayer transfers to the undocumented
population.
A worthwhile parallel may be New York City's plan to provide clean needles to heroin addicts
with the hope of reducing the spread of AIDS, the deadly disease which can be transmitted
through dirty needles. See Kerr, Weighing of 2 Perils Led to Needles-for-Addicts Plan, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at B1, col. 2. From an after-the-fact perspective, giving needles to heroin
addicts seems to constitute official endorsement of drug addiction. In contrast, a before-the-fact
perspective reveals that the prospect of clean needles should not trigger a surge of interest in
heroin. People who have not yet tried the drug have decades of knowledge about why they
should not start. See id. at B4 (citing slackening of interest in heroin among those not already
addicted). Even if knowledge of heroin's dangers is not an effective deterrent to use of the drug,
see supra note 73 (discussing how individuals tend to underassess degree of risk facing them and
therefore underinsure), clean needles do not fit well as an incentive to begin using heroin. A
meaningful incentive should yield more immediate gratification. See supra notes 83-101 and
accompanying text (discussing fit between sanctions and undesirable conduct as element of
deterrence). For this reason, a more effective incentive would be a cut in the price of heroin. A
price cut is obvious even to people without the knowledge, patience, or insight to assess the
lesser health risk posed by a clean needle. New York City, however, did not seek to lower the
price of heroin as part of its plan.
Just as there is little evidence that clean needles would promote increased use of heroin, there
is little indication that fear of dirty needles would dissuade many current heroin users from
continuing their drug use. All three factors governing the success of sanctions against undesirable
activity-here, heroin consumption-gravitate against the effectiveness of a fear of dirty needles
as a "cure" for heroin addiction. First, the relevant population-heroin addicts-may not know
about the heightened risk of AIDS created by using dirty needles. Second, the requisite fit may
be absent if addicts believe that their needle is the "clean" one, or that many punctures, not
just the one needed for today's fix, are necessary for the spread of AIDS. Third, addicts by
definition do not have a substantial capacity to rationally conform their conduct. They will tend
to continue their addiction, regardless of the human or financial cost.
Despite the lurid image created after-the-fact, the before the-fact ramifications for drug use
of a clean needles program do not seem alarming. The "up" side, however, in terms of decreasing
the spread of AIDS, could be considerable. Given the "down" side presented by unchecked
spread of AIDS through dirty needles, the gamble is worth the risk. The same assessment of
policy versus after-the-fact appearances holds true with employment law remedies for undocu-
mented workers.
198. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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forts and dilutes deterrence of employers' exploitation of undocumented
workers. As the exploitation of the workers continues, so does the employers'
reward.
This analysis suggests that the real choice is not between conferring and
eliminating rewards for wrongdoing, but between symbol and policy. The
model of fines functions as a symbol of society's reluctance to reward
wrongdoing by either employer or employee. However, because the model
reduces deterrence of employers' exploitative practices, it fails to actually
eliminate all rewards. As a result, the model of fines reflects poor policy.
The comprehensive remedies approach, on the other hand, makes a miserable
symbol, but fulfills policy goals. On balance, the approach which favors
sound policy over symbolism should prevail.
C. Employment Law Remedies and the Symbolism of Sovereignty
The gap between symbolism and policy also explains the sentiment that if
we allow undocumented workers to assert employment rights and remedies
for unlawful employer conduct, we damage the sense of sovereignty enjoyed
by citizens of the United States.' 99 Congress, in enacting the IRCA, viewed
maintenance of secure borders as an indispensable attribute of a sovereign
power.2°° Congress considered undocumented workers a threat to the work-
force which lawfully enjoys the benefits of United States sovereignty. 20 , This
199. I use the expression "sense of sovereignty" to convey the subjective, psychological
character of notions of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a concept prone to inflame the passions. The
concept of a nation incorporates many of the feelings of possessiveness which color views about
neighborhood, home, and property. Uncontrolled immigration seems in a visceral way to provoke
that possessiveness. The result is insecurity about our collective future. See J. HIGHAM, supra
note 1; S. LEGOMSKy, IMNUGLATION AD rHE JuDiciRY 241-53 (1987); Schuck, supra note 2, at
85-90 (maintaining sense of community within "liberal welfare state" requires some ability to
exclude others from membership in community). These insecurities may be predicated upon one's
fear of people of different races and national origins. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (explaining and approving of United States immigration laws as
means of preventing influx of foreigners, particularly Asians, with allegedly different cultural
values; Court nonetheless excepted "Christian" ministers from statutory bar on assisting immi-
gration of persons "to perform labor or service of any kind"); J. HiostAM, supra note 1, at 159-
75 (discussing ethnocentric basis of fears about immigration). Racism and ethnocentricism almost
certainly play some role in our antipathy toward undocumented persons. See Note, Developments
in the Law, supra note 3, at 1443-44 (asserting that fear of undocumented persons bears "traces
of racism reminiscent of nineteenth century paranoia about the 'yellow tide' of Asian immi-
grants").
200. See H.R. REP. No. 682 (1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5650 (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese III as stating: "[w]e cannot
fairly speak of ourselves as a sovereign nation if we cannot responsibly decide who may cross
our borders .... ").
201. See H.R. REP. No. 682 (1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMTN. NEws 5662.
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Article does not challenge either of those views. 2°2 The approach which this
Article advances, instead, presumes the need to slow the pace of illegal
immigration. Heightened enforcement of employment laws would contribute
to that goal. Yet, a familiar disquiet lingers about the effect on our sense of
sovereignty when we extend employment rights and remedies to undocumented
workers.
This disquiet stems from our "symbolic" possessiveness toward the badges
of United States citizenship and legal residency. 23 Sovereignty is a potent
symbol. The attributes of sovereignty are the attributes of home and property.
From this perspective, an uninvited intruder into a nation-an undocumented
person-is like an intruder upon private property. Intruders have the ability
to wreck our home and eat our lunch. The fear of a national version of such
a domestic disaster runs deep. This fear explains the more than a century of
concern and occasional hysteria about the flood of ignorance, crime and
disease which uncontrolled immigration could release upon our shores. 204
The polity may minimize the risk of such a disaster by regulating access
to the benefits of citizenship and legal residence through immigration tests
and quotas. These devices limit legal immigration. Some people will circum-
vent immigration restrictions and establish physical presence within the bor-
ders of the United States. However, if we allow mere physical presence in
this country to trigger the receipt of the attributes of lawful residence, we
dilute our faith in our capacity to control distribution of these attributes. 20 5
This could make it seem less worthwhile for Americans to exert themselves
in order to enhance their standard of living and community well-being. 206 The
202. This Article also does not seek to resolve the question of whether controls on immigration
have a basis in morality. For differing views on that issue, compare Schuck, supra note 2, at
73-90 (uncontrolled immigration threatens ideal of community within United States), with Com-
ment, Human Rights, supra note 16 (stressing roots of illegal immigration in political and
economic oppression). See also T. AIm~amo & D. MARnN, supra note 2, at 61-80 (excerpting
analyses by other commentators). This Article does suggest, however, that our views about
immigration and undocumented persons are shaped in part by feelings of racism, ethnocentricism,
and xenophobia. See supra note 199.
203. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 27. For another example of the role of symbolism, see
supra note 197 (discussing problem of providing clean needles to heroin addicts in order to
impede spread of AIDS). See also Perlin, supra note 68, at 88-98 (describing a symbol in Jungian
sense as "'the best possible expression for a complex fact not yet clearly ... [apprehended] by
consciousness') (quoting Jung, On Physic Energy, in 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNO, THE
STRUCTURE AND DYNAncs OF Ta PsYcHE 75 (Hull trans. 2d ed. 1972)).
204. See supra note 199.
205. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 27. See also id. at 27 n.147 (drawing parallel between
summary immigration proceeding and traditionally available summary property or debtor-creditor
remedies, such as "ex parte replevin, attachment and execution, or eviction").
206. Schuck suggests something like this process when he avers that government cannot provide
a minimum level of economic security for lawful residents of a nation and undocumented persons.
See Schuck, supra note 2, at 85-90.
The effects of a loss of faith or morale on productive capacity have been most comprehensively
described by property theorists. See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
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resulting loss of morale would create a smaller pie of resources for everyone,
including undocumented persons.
20 7
The preservation of faith in our ability to control access to the benefits of
sovereignty is a compelling goal. This goal was no doubt instrumental in the
Supreme Court's refusal to extend protections from government intrusion,
such as the exclusionary rule, to undocumented persons. 2° , If we extend these
safeguards we hinder our ability to summarily rid this country of individuals
who have ignored immigration law requirements. 2°9 Without this ability, the
physical presence factor would replace the rule requiring compliance with
immigration law as the criterion governing a given group's access to the
benefits of lawful residency in the United States.
A similar interest in controlling the benefits produced by the citizenry of
the United States accounts for the polity's unwillingness to extend need-based
entitlements such as welfare or Medicaid to undocumented persons. This
reluctance applies to both the documented and undocumented population. 210
The rationale for the restriction is that undocumented persons would take a
free ride on benefits programs if they were available. The availability of
entitlements would encourage immigration by persons who are unable or
unwilling to contribute to national wealth through productive work.
This rationale is even more compelling when one considers undocumented
persons. They enter the country without the polity's consent. In theory, if
the government provided unlimited entitlements to undocumented persons
who arrive in limitless numbers, it would bankrupt the nation. Anxiety caused
by this scenario21' could produce either a violent reaction against all immi-
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1202-58
(1967) (asserting that arbitrary and uncompensated governmental takings of property will dampen
individuals' interest in property acquisition and development). But cf. Kaplow, supra note 69,
at 560-61 (criticizing Michelman on ground that individuals should be encouraged to anticipate
and adjust to change, including change in governmental policy).
207. See Michelman, supra note 206, at 1242-45. However, one could also hypothesize that
all immigration-legal or not-expands the economic pie, by increasing the number of motivated,
productive workers. See D. NORTH & M. HousroUt, supra note 4, at 154 (describing undocu-
mented workers as hardworking and productive). But see supra note 101 (citing commentators'
views that undocumented labor tends to depress labor market). Any expanding pie effect caused
by undocumented labor would only hold true, however, if undocumented persons' contributions
to the fisc in taxes exceeded taxpayer transfers to the undocumented population. See D. NORTH
& M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 4, at 155 (asserting that undocumented persons tend to pay more
in taxes than they receive in governmental benefits and services).
208. Cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that exclusionary rule does
not apply to immigration searches).
209. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 27.
210. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (Supp. IV 1986) (barring Medicaid reimbursement for
nonemergency medical care of undocumented persons); 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV 1986) (note)
(limiting amnesty recipients' access to Medicaid to instances of emergency treatment and prenatal
care). See generally Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding five year residency require-
ment regarding permanent resident aliens' access to Medicare).
211. The scenario of ruinous immigration is a durable one in American culture. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text. See generally R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 122, at 32-35
(discussing importance of scripts and schema to human reasoning).
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grants and immigration, or a malaise that reduces overall productivity. If we
deny entitlements to undocumented persons, we obviate both risks.
Employment law rights and remedies have a degree of symbolic affinity
with both one's right to freedom from government searches and seizures and
one's eligibility for entitlement programs. Like fourth amendment protections
and entitlements, the enforcement of employment law rights and remedies
requires the participation and authority of United States courts or adminis-
trative agencies. It seems incongruous, on a purely symbolic level, for the
government, which is charged with apprehending and removing undocumented
persons, to also assist this group by granting them remedies which include
monetary relief. Monetary relief seems to resemble an award of welfare or
some other entitlement because it involves the conveyance of cash to the
undocumented person. The system's inclusion of undocumented persons in
this largess could spark a loss of morale among lawful residents.
The symbolic affront evoked by providing employment law remedies for
undocumented workers, however, is tempered by two palliatives. The first
palliative flows from the degree of public awareness of employment law rights
and remedies. The second palliative flows from the substantive distinctions
between those rights and remedies, and other rights reserved for lawful
residents.
Public awareness of employment law rights and remedies is low. Members
of the public at large may have a higher awareness of the area than do
undocumented persons. However, members of the public do not typically
specialize in employment law. They therefore may not have knowledge of
employment law remedies which are available to undocumented workers. This
lack of knowledge dulls the impact of the symbolic affront.
Substantive distinctions also exist between employment law rights and
remedies and other rights not granted to the undocumented population.
Employment rights and remedies are substantially different from constitu-
tional protections such as the exclusionary rule because the availability of
employment law rights and remedies does not reduce the INS's capacity to
detect and deport undocumented persons. Employment law protections do
not limit the INS's ability to collect evidence on undocumented persons'
status. Such remedies also do not hinder the INS' ability, upon presentation
of that evidence, to arrange for the speedy departure of illegal immigrants.
Employment protections extend rights of employees against employers, not
against the INS. Indeed, a system which instills employment protections
simplifies INS enforcement policies by limiting employer demand for undoc-
umented labor.
Government provisions for employment law rights and remedies are also
different from need-based entitlements. Employment law protections do not
require taxpayer transfers to the undocumented population. Indeed, employ-
ment law protections for undocumented workers are desirable, in part, because
they tend to reduce such transfers. 212
212. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
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Courts must consider the force of symbolism in light of these substantive
arguments. In general, the population is not well-versed in employment law
or immigration policy. For those who do not take the time to comprehend
fully the policies underlying these laws, these substantive arguments will have
no impact on symbolic concerns. 21 3 However, honoring symbolism over sub-
stance in this area does not mesh with the courts' insistence in other areas
of the law that classifications be based upon rationality and not reflex.214
Congress has greater flexibility to dispense with diligence and defer to
symbolism in the immigration area. However, Congress has not exercised
that flexibility with regard to employment law rights and remedies. Courts
and agencies should not take textual silence in statutes such as the IRCA as
a license for symbolism's triumph.
Where the statute's text is silent, courts and agencies should look beyond
the residue of symbolism and toward policy consequences. 215 Immigration and
employment policy support employment law protections for undocumented
workers. Courts and agencies should enforce those protections in a form that
would provide such persons with comprehensive relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
Finding a place for undocumented workers in the scheme of employment
law presents a difficult challenge for judicial and agency decision-makers.
Making employment law rights and remedies available to undocumented
workers is admittedly counterintuitive. 21 6 Affording undocumented workers
protection under federal employment law seems at first blush like a reward
for illegal immigration. It is clear that a key goal of federal immigration
213. A relative lack of interest in thinking through abstract concepts seems to pervade the
human condition. See A. TVERSKY & D. KAHNEMAN, supra note 71, at 111-16 (people are
influenced more by anecdotes and personal encounters than by accounts of statistical trends);
R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 122, at 43-62 (concrete instances with emotional impact exert
more influence than reports of statistical probabilities).
214. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (discussing
modern equal protection jurisprudence as part of decision striking down "irrational" restriction
on establishment of group homes for the mentally retarded). Cf. Margulies, supra note 118
(discussing Cleburne); Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred-Year Flood Plains" and Other Unconstitutional
Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Retarded, 16 FORD.
URB. L.J. 1 (1988) (same). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has on occasion displayed less
commitment to principles of rational classification when confronted with exigent circumstances
and a classification disadvantaging a group of Americans of foreign ancestry. See, e.g., Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding federal statute, enacted after the United
States entered World War II, which classified all "American citizens of Japanese ancestry" as
creating a threat of sabotage). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down Texas
statute which barred undocumented aliens' children from public schools).
215. Cf. Schuck, supra note 2, at 84 (recommending that courts use "clear statement" doctrine
to refrain from presuming, in the absence of a clear congressional mandate, that a statute
requires the worst possible hardship for undocumented persons); supra note 131 (discussing clear
statement doctrine).
216. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
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policy is to reduce illegal immigration. Providing rewards for illegal immi-
gration frustrates that goal. Sound policy in an imperfect world suggests,
however, that surrendering to intuition in the treatment of undocumented
workers under federal employment law actually promotes the outcome which
we wish to avoid.
On the other hand, a system which provides a full panoply of employment
law rights and remedies helps discourage illegal immigration. This regime
targets sanctions against domestic employers who hire undocumented workers
for the purpose of exploiting their vulnerability. If we structure sanctions
against employers of undocumented labor, this robs employers of their in-
centive to hire from this captive population. Congress, in enacting the IRCA,
confirmed this view. Supplementing the IRCA's employer sanctions provisions
with private employment law rights and remedies will deter the hiring of
undocumented workers. Without the prospect of employment, illegal immi-
gration should decrease.
Deterrence of illegal immigration is not the only goal of immigration policy
served when a court or agency grants employment law protections to undo-
cumented workers. A secondary objective of immigration policy which em-
ployment law protections promote is the avoidance of taxpayer transfers to
undocumented persons. While employment law protections will discourage
future illegal immigration by retracting employer demand, these protections
will also reduce employers' harsh treatment of those who previously entered
the United States illegally. Undocumented workers who are protected from
employer forfeitures and exploitation will have less need to turn to the
government for help.
Institutional concerns for preserving the legitimacy and resources of courts
and agencies supplement the policy arguments for allowing broad employment
law protections. Courts and agencies, unlike Congress, are relatively unac-
countable. Their decision-making capacity is spread over legions of matters
requiring timely attention. If the system excepts undocumented workers as a
group from employment rights and remedies, then the result would qualify
broad statutory language in the service of uncertain policy. This gambit is
inconsistent with courts' and agencies' lack of accountability. Such exceptions
would also require duplicative determinations of immigration status by courts
and agencies which lack expertise in immigration matters. This result further
taxes decision-making capacity. The system which provides for broad avail-
ability of employment rights and relief avoids these institutional costs.
Despite its advantages, the comprehensive approach to rights and relief for
undocumented workers triggers objections. The objections are threefold: first,
the concept of reinstating undocumented workers violates the IRCA, by
compelling one to employ unauthorized workers; second, the concept of
"rewarding" an undocumented worker with such protections and remedies
enables the worker to, in effect, profit from the crime of illegal entry into
the United States, which therefore violates principles of equity; and third,
this reward somehow compromises our ability, and our belief in our ability,
to control our borders and restrict the size and membership of our polity.
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Although these counterarguments have some symbolic force, one must heavily
discount their impact.
Discounting these objections is appropriate because rights which we deny
undocumented workers do not politely exit from calculations of equity and
immigration policy. Instead, the absence of employment rights reappears on
the other side of the equation as an inequitable advantage for exploitative
employers. Such a result serves neither equity nor policy.
In a sense, all of the objections to the comprehensive remedial approach
recapitulate the United States' traditional dialogue between instincts of invi-
tation on the one hand and distrust of immigration on the other. Granting
comprehensive employment rights to undocumented workers does not con-
stitute an invitation. In fact, this Article advocates the approach as a deterrent
to illegal immigration. However, the approach recognizes that undocumented
persons currently living in the United States may serve a useful function in
strengthening this deterrent. By pursuing employment law remedies, they can
reduce employer demand for undocumented labor as a group.
An approach which uses undocumented workers to reduce employer de-
mand for undocumented labor triggers instincts of distrust because employ-
ment law remedies improve undocumented workers' situations in the short
term. This improvement seems like a reward for illegal immigration. Offering
such a bounty to undocumented persons is especially offensive because it
points up the inadequacy of governmental enforcement efforts. United States
residents may become anxious if the federal government tacitly concedes that
it must deputize undocumented persons in order to help cope with the causes
of illegal immigration. Isolating undocumented persons from American law
may make legal residents feel more secure.
Adoption of the comprehensive approach which this Article recommends
will not banish misgivings based on a symbolic sense of equity or sovereignty.
These misgivings will linger. However, the system which permits these mis-
givings to prevail forfeits the advantages of the broad approach to employment
law rights and remedies for deterrence of illegal immigration, reduction of
taxpayer transfers to the undocumented population, and preservation of
institutional resources and legitimacy. Courts and agencies should acknowl-
edge their misgivings, but nonetheless opt for the advantages created by
comprehensive employment law protections for undocumented workers.
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